The Men in Green: African Americans and the Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942 by Hoak, Michael Shane
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
2002 
The Men in Green: African Americans and the Civilian 
Conservation Corps, 1933-1942 
Michael Shane Hoak 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the African American Studies Commons, African History Commons, and the United States 
History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hoak, Michael Shane, "The Men in Green: African Americans and the Civilian Conservation Corps, 
1933-1942" (2002). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539626375. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-h2yd-7p07 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
The Men in Green:
African Americans and the Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of History 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
by
Michael Hoak 
2002
APPROVAL SHEET 
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Author
Approved, July 2002
Kimberley Phillips
Phil Funigiello
( O  Gilbert M cArthur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii
ABSTRACT iv
INTRODUCTION 2
CHAPTER I. A SUM OF ITS PARTS 7
CHAPTER II. BLACK TEACHERS IN BLACK SCHOOLS 27
CHAPTER III. A DAY IN THE LIFE 49
CONCLUSION 73
BIBLIOGRAPHY 75
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The writer wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Kimberley L. Phillips 
for her thoughtful guidance and unusual patience. Her advice has strengthened this work 
immeasurably. Professor Phil Funigiello offered critical support and advice during the 
initial phases of my research. At Colonial National Historical Park, Jane Sundberg and 
Karen Rehm provided valuable information about the park and the surrounding 
community. They strongly supported this work from its inception and have since 
incorporated some of the contents into the park’s interpretation program. The author is 
also indebted to Reed Engle at Shenandoah National Park for his endless discussions on 
CCC policy and oral interviews. Lastly, I would like to thank Steve Feeley, Kevin 
Butterfield, Mary Ann Curran, and Frank Dozier for reading the entire manuscript and 
offering helpful editorial comments.
ABSTRACT
This study examines the role of African Americans in the Civilian 
Conservation Corps (CCC) camps at Yorktown, Virginia. The CCC was a New Deal 
work program that employed young men and World War I veterans to work in 
reforestation and conservation projects throughout the country. Over 2.5 million men 
served in the CCC, and roughly 250,000 of those men were African American. Black 
enrollees in the program faced widespread discrimination and segregation. This study 
argues that the CCC became most segregated at the local level. However, the most 
powerful critique of segregation within the program also developed locally. Whites 
insistence on segregation allowed blacks to turn that very insistence against them. 
Black leaders in the Tidewater area campaigned for the appointment of black 
educators in the Yorktown camps on the notion that “separate but equal” insured the 
employment of black teachers in all-black schools. Meanwhile, enrollees, lacking 
access to prominent government officials, acted on a daily basis to circumvent the 
rigid discipline and work schedules practiced by the white camp commanders. They 
also responded to the hostility of the local white population by openly protesting in a 
narrowly averted race riot, and by finding acceptance in local black neighborhoods.
v,
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CONSERVATION CORPS, 1933-1942
INTRODUCTION
2
Between 1933 and 1942, over 2.5 million men participated in the largest 
conservation project in American history. They planted over one billion trees, built 5,000 
miles of roads, and constructed virtually the entire infrastructure for the nation’s national 
parks. The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) became the most popular program in 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal alphabet soup. Even today, ceremonies are 
held across the country to honor the efforts of the CCC, and the few remaining veterans 
of the program hold annual meetings to discuss their fond memories.1
Lost in the cacophony of memorials and anniversary celebrations is the way in 
which the history of the CCC offers a window into New Deal era social relations. Of 
those 2.5 million men that served in the CCC, 250,000 were African American. Though 
promised “equal participation and opportunity,” black men that enrolled in the CCC often 
found something far different. Black enrollment numbers were capped at an artificially 
low level, black camps were strictly segregated, and black men were not allowed to serve 
in most supervisory positions.
New Deal historians have largely ignored black participation in the CCC. The 
epic tomes of New Deal history briefly mention the program as a whole, but never reflect 
on African American involvement. Most of the available works on the CCC fall into the 
category of celebratory history. The handful of academic works on the CCC dedicate no 
more than a chapter to black participation in the program, and then analyze it only from 
the national level, relying on CCC documents alone to analyze a multifaceted subject.
1 Stan Cohen, The Tree Armv: A Pictorial History of the Civilian Conservation Corns. 1933-1942 
(Missoula, Missouri: Pictorial Histories Publishing Company, 1980), 23.
3Olen Cole’s research on African American CCC camps in California focused only on 
national black organizations and ignored local forces. He has argued that the 
segregationist policy of the CCC was a direct product of Army doctrine and prevailing 
government practice. While partially true, this argument has not adequately addressed 
the impact of local events in the formation of national CCC policy.2
My evidence illustrates that Roosevelt’s laudable efforts to place men in the field 
as quickly as possible led to the increased participation of local and state authorities. The 
participation of local government officials often led to widespread discrimination against 
African American applicants, which was compounded by the official policy of 
segregation adopted by the CCC. However, that policy of segregation was not created in 
a vacuum.
The genesis of the CCC’s segregation policy can be found in the hostility of some 
local white communities to the placement of black camps in their neighborhoods. 
Acceptance of all-black camps in Yorktown rested solely on the practice of segregation 
and the preservation of skilled CCC supervisory positions for white workers. Many 
white communities were willing to accept black camps only with the assurance that no 
black enrollees would be allowed to serve in supervisory positions. For communities 
such as Yorktown, black men in leadership positions of virtually any kind proved
2 James MacGregor Bums, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956); 
Cohen, The Tree Army: Olen Cole, The African American Experience in the Civilian 
Conservation Corps (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1999); Charles Harper. The 
Administration of the Civilian Conservation Corps (Clarksburg, West Virginia: Clarksburg 
Publishers, 1939); Leslie Lacy, The Soil Soldiers: The Civilian Conservations Corps in the Great 
Depression (Radnor, Pennsylvania: Chilton Book Company, 1976); William Leuchtenberg, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1963); 
Perry Merrill, Roosevelt’s Forest Armv: A History of the Civilian Conservation Corps 
(Montpelier, Vermont: Perry H. Merrill Publishing, 1981); John Salmond, The Civilian 
Conservations Corps. 1933-1942: A New Deal Case Study (Durham: Duke University Press,
4anathema. CCC Director Robert Fechner acknowledged this reality when establishing 
national CCC policy.
Local black leaders in the Yorktown community professed an alternative 
narrative. Hughes Robinson argued that African American enrollees deserved to be 
considered for any leadership position in the CCC despite the outcries of the local white 
community. He developed an education program, with the help of the president of 
Hampton Institute, to prepare the men for life outside of the camps. Despite their 
rigorous work schedules, the enrollees actively participated and helped shape the contents 
of the program. When Robinson’s educational framework became a standard for all 
black camps, he worked with other organizations to secure the appointment of black 
educators in black CCC camps by working with a Democratic Party in search of black 
votes and turning whites insistence on segregation against them
The efforts of local leaders were enhanced by the individual actions of the 
enrollees themselves. Enrollees did not have access to prominent officials so they instead 
turned to a long history of resistance to arbitrary authority, exclusion, and intrusion into 
their private lives. The Army-like rigidity of camp life and the pervasive racism of the 
local community led to periods of widespread dissatisfaction. Enrollees expressed their 
displeasure by refusing to work and deserting the camps. The men also attempted to 
overcome the limitations placed on the exercise of their leisure. In one extreme example, 
enrollees encircled the local jail to defend six men they believed falsely accused of 
injuring a local white child. The men ultimately found a myriad of means to mitigate the 
racial policies of the CCC and the local community.
1967); Arthur Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1958).
5Facing exclusion from the environs of Yorktown proper, black enrollees spent 
their weekends visiting local black communities. In Uniontown, Newport News, and 
other surrounding black neighborhoods, enrollees found the freedom and acceptance 
denied them by camp officials and local white citizens. Despite the their regional and age 
differences, the men turned segregation into congregation.
The history of African American involvement in the CCC is incomplete without 
an analysis of events at the local level. A macro view of events ignores the actions of 
individuals and instills a false sense of complete authority to government officials. The 
policy of segregation adopted by the CCC had its roots in local opposition. Likewise, 
black criticism of that policy can only be analyzed from the bottom up.
Chapter one of the thesis analyzes the development of the CCC program and its 
links to segregation. Chapter two is a history of educational efforts in the Yorktown 
camps that outlines the efforts of local black elites to develop classes for enrollees and 
the role that black enrollees played in the selection of courses. The chapter also examines 
the efforts of black leaders to gain employment opportunities for black educators in the 
CCC and the ways in which the educational program changed under the direction of the 
CCC. The third and final chapter provides an in-depth look at the efforts of the enrolled 
men to shape the nature of their work and their leisure.
My analysis utilizes a wide range of hitherto unexamined primary sources to paint 
a portrait of the CCC at the local level. Prior CCC historians have relied solely on the 
massive CCC document collection in the National Archives. The records contain 
voluminous reports from the camp commanders on camp activities, but they contain little 
information on the interaction between enrollees and local authorities. This analysis
6augments CCC sources with material from the records collections of Colonial National 
Historical Park, Hampton Institute, the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), and the Virginia State Library.
CHAPTER I
A SUM OF ITS PARTS: THE CREATION OF THE CCC
Segregation in the Civilian Conservation Corps was a direct product of the 
organization’s rapid assembly, its reliance on state and local government agencies, 
and the complicity of CCC officials. Black enrollees faced discrimination in the 
selection process and segregation inside of the camps. In Yorktown, white residents 
refused to accept four black CCC camps unless the program insured skilled positions 
would be available only to whites and that the camps would adopt the practice of 
segregation. The national leadership of the CCC determined that local and state 
support was vital to the success of the CCC, and refused to sacrifice that support to 
challenge any prevailing social practices. The United States Army, a bastion of 
segregation in its own right, worked in tandem with local officials to insure that the 
CCC would not become a social experiment in integration. The Director of the CCC 
capitalized on segregation as the centerpiece of a strategy to gamer local support for 
African American CCC camps in Yorktown and national support for CCC policy. As 
a result, the CCC became most segregated at the local level.1
1 Information on discrimination in the selection process can be found in John A. Salmond, 
The Civilian Conservation Corps. 1933-1942: A New Deal Case Study (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1967). The best secondary resource available on the Army’s relationship 
with the CCC is Charles W. Johnson, “The Army, The Negro and the Civilian Conservation
Corps,” Military Affairs 3 (October 1972): 82-88. However, my argument stresses the role of
local white communities in the formulation of CCC policy. The aforementioned authors
largely disregard local reaction to the camps because they rely solely on the CCC document
collection in the National Archives. This study attempts to meld that material with state and
local records ignored by prior CCC historians.
7
8Franklin Roosevelt was elected in 1932 on the promise of a New Deal—a 
program to alleviate the nation’s gripping economic crisis. One of his first decisions 
as President was the implementation of a national reforestation program, loosely 
based on a similar program he initiated while governor of New York. It combined 
two of Roosevelt’s major objectives as President: the development of land and water 
resources and the economic relief of unemployed men. On the morning of March 14, 
1933, he discussed the basic framework of the program with his advisor, and close 
friend, Raymond Moley. After explaining the program, Roosevelt exclaimed, “I 
think I’ll go ahead with this, the way I did on beer”—ten days later the bill became 
law. More than any other New Deal agency, the CCC bore Roosevelt’s personal 
mark.2
The details of the proposed bill were openly debated among Roosevelt’s 
cabinet members. On March 15, Roosevelt presented the members with his plan to 
employ 500,000 men in a national reforestation program by the beginning of June. 
After reading the bill, the secretaries of Agriculture, Labor, War, and the Interior 
argued that the CCC should be “strictly limited to works which are not available as 
projects for public works . . .  and it is highly desirable that they should be specifically 
confined to forestry and soil erosion projects in the Bill.” By limiting the program, 
the secretaries hoped to counteract the inevitable criticism of labor organizations and 
skittish southern Congressmen.3
2 James MacGregor Bums, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 
and World, Inc., 1956); William E. Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1963); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of 
Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958).
3 Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, 10; Harold Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold 
Ickes: The First Thousand Days (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), 7.
9In his “Relief of Unemployment” address to Congress, Roosevelt formally 
proposed “to create a Civilian Conservation Corps” to be involved in “simple work,” 
not interfering with “normal employment,” and following the suggestion of his 
advisors, confining itself to “forestry, the prevention of soil erosion, flood control and 
similar projects.” In addition to the obvious material gain offered each participant, 
Roosevelt believed the program’s greatest contribution would be “the moral and 
spiritual value of such work.” The overwhelming majority of unemployed 
Americans, he claimed, “would infinitely prefer to work,” and the CCC would serve 
to “eliminate to some extent at least the threat that enforced idleness brings to 
spiritual and moral stability.”4
Wanting to act as quickly as possible, Roosevelt planned to utilize the existing 
machinery of the War, Labor, and Interior departments. The creation of an entirely 
separate government entity was too time consuming, and virtually impossible given 
the limited size of the federal bureaucracy in 1933. Initial funding came from 
unappropriated public works funds rather than separate government expenditures. 
Following the President’s message, identical bills for “The Relief of Unemployment 
Through the Performance of Useful Public Work and for Other Purposes” were 
introduced in the House and Senate chambers, and were quickly referred to a joint 
congressional committee.5
With the noted exception of the New York Times, the mainstream press largely 
ignored the measure, but it drew strong dissent from organized labor. Led by William 
Green of the American Federation of Labor, labor organizations strongly abhorred the
4 Congress, House, President’s Message to Congress on Relief of Unemployment, 73rd 
Congress, 1st sess., Congressional Record, v. 77, pt. 1, 650.
10
involvement of the Army in the CCC program, as well as the proposed $1 per day 
wage scale. Green feared that the plan would lead to the “regimentation of labor,” 
and claimed that the bill trumpeted “grave apprehensions in the hearts and minds of 
labor.” Green, criticizing the involvement of the Army, proclaimed before a 
congressional committee, “This is military control itself. . .  It smacks as I see it, of 
fascism, of Hitlerism, of a form of sovietism.” A.F. Whitney, president of the 
Brotherhood of Trainmen, similarly complained that the proposed pay scale “would 
place Government’s endorsement upon poverty at a bare subsistence level.”6
In her testimony before the committee, Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins 
attempted to dispel the rumors being spread by the legislation’s vocal opponents. She 
stressed the need for programs directed at young, unmarried men, commonly left out 
of state and local welfare programs. Many of these young men, according to Perkins, 
had been forced “to a standard of living and type of behavior which they as good, 
sound Americans could not endorse.” When asked about the $1 per day wage upon 
private industry, she dismissed labor critics, stating, “I think that ordinary self 
protection would lead industrialists to recognize the need of paying a wage which will 
produce more purchasing power.”7
Army Chief of Staff Douglas Mac Arthur appeared before the committee and 
attempted to fully explain the role of the military in the project. The Army would be 
responsible for establishing and commanding each of the camps, and would provide 
food, shelter, and clothing for each enrollee. Roosevelt relied on the Army largely
5 Ibid, 701.
6 New York Times. 22 March 1933,2; Congress, Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, 
Unemployment Relief: Joint Hearings on S. 598. 73rd Cong., 1st sess., 23 March 1933, 8.
7 Unemployment Relief. 22, 25-26.
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out of necessity—no other government agency was capable of mobilizing a 
significant number of men in such a short amount of time. In fact, Roosevelt’s call 
for an initial deployment of 500,000 men was the largest mobilization in the United 
States since World War I. Despite the obvious need for military involvement, 
members of Congress worried that the enrollees would undergo military training. 
MacArthur assured the members that there would be “No military training 
whatsoever.”8
The final bill, approved by the joint committee and delivered on the House 
and Senate floors, varied greatly from the original proposal. Direct references to the 
War Department and the $1 per day wage were struck from the document; in their 
place, the bill authorized the President to “under such rules and regulations as he may 
prescribe and by using such existing departments or agencies as he may designate, to 
provide for employing citizens of the United States who are unemployed, in the 
construction, maintenance and carrying out of works of a public nature in connection 
with the forestation of lands belonging to the United States.” The language was 
significantly vague in order to allow Roosevelt the flexibility to develop the program 
as he wished within a broad set of guidelines. Several members amended the bill, 
adding minor points, but one amendment, written by the sole black member of the 
House, Oscar DePriest, a Democrat from Illinois, proved to have far reaching 
consequences. The amendment, initially an afterthought, provided that “no 
discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, or creed.” The struggle to
8 Ibid, 42.
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uphold the integrity of that statement proved to be a contentious issue for the duration 
of the program.9
After receiving congressional approval, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 
6101 officially creating the CCC. The order established a fund for the program which 
drew from unobligated public works funds, and government departments were 
required to furnish the program with supplies and materials. Robert Fechner, vice 
president of the American Federation of Labor and a leading figure in the 
International Association of Machinists, was appointed as the director of the program. 
His ties to organized labor proved useful in dampening their vocal objections to the 
program. Roosevelt also appointed an oversight Advisory Council to the Director 
composed of representatives from the War, Agriculture, Labor, and Interior 
departments. Each individual agency was responsible for a particular aspect of the 
program, while Fechner and the CCC office coordinated the activities of the four 
agencies. According to Roosevelt, the Army and “the forestry people” in the 
Agriculture and Interior departments “would really run the show;” Labor would 
“select the men and make the rules;” and Fechner would “go along and give 
everybody satisfaction and confidence.”10
Facing a June 5 deadline, government officials wasted no time in cementing 
the initial structure of the program. The Department of Labor had the task of 
selecting and enrolling eligible candidates for the program. Understaffed and
9 Public Act No. 5, a copy can be found in “Federal CCC” file, Box 16, Executive 
Correspondence, The Executive Papers of George C. Peery. The executive correspondence 
of Governor Peery will hereafter be referred to as GCP. Nancy J. Weiss, Farewell to the 
Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983), 81-84, contains a brief biography of DePriest.
overwhelmed by the number of applicant, the agency could not enroll so many men, 
so quickly. They decided instead to rely on state and local relief agencies to enroll 
the men. The state and local agencies would then report directly to the Department of 
Labor. Practically overnight, Department of Labor officials prepared detailed 
instruction booklets for each relief official and released information to the press about 
the upcoming enrollment. Thus, the decentralized nature of the selection process was 
a direct product of the hurried attempt to place men in the field by the summer.11
In Virginia, the selection of enrollees came under the auspices of the Virginia 
Emergency Relief Agency (later renamed the State Department of Welfare). CCC 
Director Robert Fechner set quotas for each state, which were based roughly on the 
total number of men on state relief rolls in relation to the total nation-wide. The 
director of the CCC selection program for the Department of Labor, W. Frank 
Persons, then passed the totals to the state director of welfare relief, who divided the 
totals among various counties and towns. Each county appointed a local official, 
usually someone already acting as a state relief agent in the area, to recruit and enroll 
eligible men in the program. Based on their own judgment of the applicant’s ability 
to perform the job, local officials, not state or federal, had the authority to select or 
deny individual applicants. In the words of Arthur James, the Virginia Commissioner 
of Public Welfare, “the selection, therefore, becomes a matter of social work,
10 Executive Order 6101, copy in “Federal CCC” file, Box 16, GCP; Salmond, New Deal 
Case Study. 27-28, Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt. 335-339.
11 Frances Perkins to George Peery, 15 April 1933, “Federal CCC” file, Box 16, GCP. For a 
more complete discussion of black enrollment in the CCC consult John A. Salmond, “The 
Civilian Conservation Corps and the Negro,” Journal of American History 52 (June 1965): 
73-88.
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judgment, and conscience, over which no one except the communities has any real 
control.”12
Despite their relative autonomy, selecting agents had to follow basic 
guidelines from the Department of Labor. For example, the program was initially 
limited to “young men between the ages of 18 and 25,” who were “citizens of the 
United States, unmarried and unemployed who wish to volunteer for the work, and 
who wish to allot a substantial portion of their $30 monthly cash allowance to their 
dependants.” The men were also expected to be physically fit, and able to serve for at 
least one six-month enrollment period. In addition, the Department of Labor insisted 
that “no discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, or creed.” Some
selecting agents, however, did everything within their power to resist the Department
11of Labor* s non-discrimination clause.
The selection of black enrollees proved to be a troubling issue from the very 
beginning of the CCC. Immediately after the initial selection process began, reports 
from the South suggested that local selection agents were excluding blacks from 
enrollment. In Georgia, selection agents refused to enroll a single black applicant for 
almost a year. Several prominent black citizens complained to the Department of 
Labor and the CCC. Director Fechner responded that there was little he could do to 
rectify the problem. Meanwhile, W. Frank Persons decided to take a more active 
approach by threatening to withhold the state’s entire CCC allotment for the
12 William A. Smith to W. Frank Persons, 3 August 1936, “Federal CCC” file, Box 16, GCP; 
Selection Bulletin No. 1, “Federal CCC” file, Box 16, GCP; Newport News Daily Press, 28 
April 1933.
13 Selection Bulletin No. 2, “Federal CCC” file, Box 16, GCP.
15
upcoming enrollment period. Facing an elimination of their enrollment, Georgia 
officials relented, accepting a token number of black applicants into the program.14
During Virginia’s first enrollment period, a local selecting agent in 
Portsmouth, an area containing a substantial black population, refused to accept any 
black applicants into the program. J. Thomas Newsome, the black editor of the 
Norfolk Journal and Guide, wrote a scathing editorial decrying the low rates of black 
enrollment in Portsmouth and other cities in Virginia. Arthur James responded to 
Newsome, in a letter later published in the newspaper, that he had contacted each 
local relief agency in the state and instructed them that blacks were indeed eligible for 
enrollment. Eventually, Newsome’s protest led to the full enrollment of black men in 
the Portsmouth area.15
Overall, Virginia proved more willing to enroll black men in the CCC than 
most other southern states. According to a survey conducted by the state, black men 
composed approximately 15% of the total Virginia CCC enrollment for 1935, and it 
appears this percentage stayed relatively constant throughout the life of the program. 
This percentage fell short of the actual 26.8% of the total Virginia population in 1930 
that was black, and the even larger percentage of blacks on state relief rolls.
However, the state more than met the 10% black enrollment rate mandated by 
Director Fechner, and surpassed the 5% to 10% black enrollment average in southern
14 Salmond, New Deal Case Study. 83-85, 94. The first black enrollees from Georgia 
constituted less than 1% of the state’s total enrollees.
15 Norfolk Journal and Guide. 8 July 1933,2.
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states with much larger African American populations such as Mississippi and 
Georgia.16
The CCC was not the only New Deal program beset by discrimination. The 
Works Progress Administration (WPA), the New Deal program that would eventually 
become one of the largest employers of African Americans in the country, 
experienced similar enrollment problems. During the initial phases of the program, 
local selecting agents refused to hire African Americans. Black enrollees were also 
allowed very limited access to supervisory positions. The National Recovery 
Administration was widely criticized by black organizations for codifying large wage 
discrepancies between white and black workers in the South. The Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, a program that paid farmers to withdraw cotton land from 
production, relied on county committees to administer the law at the local level. The 
committees excluded blacks from participation, which allowed white landowners to 
institute policies that drove black landowners into the ranks of sharecroppers and 
forced growing numbers of sharecroppers off the land entirely.17
An exception to the pattern of discrimination in New Deal programs was the 
Public Works Administration (PWA). Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes utilized 
his complete control of the PWA to “offer blacks a square deal.” When the PWA
16 Unfortunately, no state enrollment sheets exist before 1935. The percentage of African 
American involvement in the program was calculated using October, 1935 enrollment data 
from Arthur T. James to George Peery, 5 October 1933, “Federal CCC” file, Box 16, GCP; 
and the calculations presented in Joseph Carvalho III, “Race, Relief and Politics: The Civilian 
Conservation Corps, 1933-1942, Masters thesis, College of William and Mary, 1977, 66. 
State population figures came from United States Census Bureau, 19th Census of the United 
States, v. 2, “Characteristics of the Population” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1941), 134.
17 Earl Lewis et al, To Make Our World Anew: A History of African Americans (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 409-433.
17
began to build public housing units, Ickes instituted specific percentage contract 
requirements. The PWA contracts required contractors to insure that the number of 
blacks hired and their percentage of the project payroll was equal to the proportion of 
African Americans in the 1930 occupational census. Historian Nancy Weiss argues 
that “agencies [like the PWA] that were run with heavy centralized control made it 
easier to protect the interest of blacks; where local control was powerful, there was 
always a battle.”18
The exclusion of African American enrollees, initiated by local selection 
officials, was greatly exacerbated by the official policies of the CCC. Problems at the 
national level began first and foremost with the camp site selection process. Sites 
were selected based on the labor needs of the Interior and Agriculture departments. 
Fechner assessed those needs, and after consulting with leading Army officials, 
selected the final location of each CCC camp. What became vital for African 
Americans was the selection of camp sites for black camps. In discussing the matter, 
Fechner wrote, “Whether we like it or not, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that 
there are communities and States that do not want and will not accept a Negro 
Civilian Conservation Corps camp.” Fechner further declared that he was unwilling 
“to compel any community to accept a Negro company...  against its will.” As a 
result, many areas throughout the country did not have enough black camps to house 
African American enrollees, thus placing a significant limit on black enrollment.19
18 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln. 50-52. It is interesting that Weiss makes no more 
than a passing reference to this argument. I intend to explore this idea more fully in my 
upcoming dissertation.
19 Robert Fechner to Robert J. Bulkley, 4 June 1936, “CCC Negro Selection” file, Box 700, 
General Correspondence of the Director, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, 
MD; Robert Fechner to Thomas L. Griffith, 21 September 1935, “CCC Negro Selection” file,
18
The CCC’s support for segregation was not the sole responsibility of Robert 
Fechner. The policies of the CCC ran congruent with, and were unabashedly 
supported by, officials in the War Department. In the words of a dissenting NAACP 
official, “the War Department policy is segregation top to bottom in everything it 
handles.” In his study of the Army’s role in the CCC, historian Charles Johnson 
came to a similar conclusion, arguing “this was clearly discrimination based on race.” 
The War Department’s policy on segregation was an unwritten code that placed strict 
limits on the positions available to black recruits. African American soldiers were 
overwhelmingly relegated to so-called menial jobs such as food preparation and ditch 
digging. During World War I black soldiers expressed their anger at the military’s 
rigid caste system, and that same criticism would take on a new life as black enrollees 
in the CCC entered camps operated by the War Department staffed by Army officers 
steeped in the culture of military segregation.20
Following the suggestion of Colonel Major, the Army’s representative to the 
CCC Advisory Council, Fechner decided in 1935 to place black enrollment on a 
“replacement only” basis, effectively placing a cap on the development of new black 
camps. As a result, black enrollees—who normally stayed in the program longer than
their white counterparts—found fewer and fewer opportunities to participate in the
21program.
Box 700, General Correspondence of the Director, Record Group 35, National Archives, 
College Park, MD. It is interesting to note that Roosevelt, as assistant secretary of the Navy 
during World War I, supported the racial segregation of the armed forces.
20 Charles W. Johnson, “The Army, The Negro and the Civilian Conservation Corps,” 
Military Affairs 3 (October 1972): 82-88. It is interesting to note that Roosevelt, as assistant 
secretary of the Navy during World War I, supported the racial segregation of the armed 
forces. Lewis et al, To Make Our World Anew. 412.
21 Ibid, 83.
19
Fechner supported the Army’s decision to appoint only white officers and 
supervisory personnel in black camps because Fechner knew that the Army was vital 
to the success of the CCC, and he did not want to challenge them. The Army tried to 
support their segregationist stance by presenting Fechner with a series of studies— 
conducted by the Army during World War I to blunt the criticism of black newspaper 
editors critical of the military’s policy—that black men performed more efficiently 
under white supervision.22
Fechner’s support for white supervisors in black camps, however, must not be 
viewed as a mere capitulation to the War Department. In his correspondence with 
community and state leaders, Fechner realized almost immediately that the promise of 
strict segregation proved useful in gaining local support for black camps. Local 
communities in Virginia proved willing to accept black camps if they conformed to 
southern labor and social practices. Any camp that outwardly appeared to thwart the 
southern divisions of labor and white male hegemony, as witnessed in Yorktown, 
Virginia, faced a vehement backlash from the surrounding community.
On April 9, 1933, two all-black camps were established at Colonial National 
Monument in Yorktown, Virginia. The two camps, comprised of Virginia and 
Maryland recruits, housed over 400 enrollees in a series of buildings hastily 
constructed from prefabricated lumber supplies. On October 13, 1933, two new black 
companies, containing 400 men from New York City and the surrounding area, were 
moved from Wawayanda, New York to the grounds at Yorktown, erecting two camps 
adjacent to the existing site. Yorktown had been chosen as a CCC site because of its 
noted historical importance, the insistence of the park’s zealous supervisor, and
22 Ibid, 82.
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because the land was owned by the federal government, offering the CCC more 
leverage in the event that local citizens opposed the establishment of the camps. 
According to local newspaper reports, the Yorktown community embraced the camps, 
in the hope that the historical restoration of the Revolutionary battlefield, along with 
Rockefeller’s vast colonial reconstruction project several miles up the road in 
Williamsburg, would bolster the area’s tourism industry and boost local revenue. 
However, local support proved to be tenuous at best.23
In October 1935, a rumor began to circulate within the community that the 
white supervisors in the Yorktown camps were about to be replaced by blacks from 
the surrounding area. Since the inception of the CCC, Secretary of the Interior 
Harold Ickes had been arguing for equal access to supervisory positions in the 
program. A noted integrationist and former chairman of the NACCP in Chicago, 
Ickes hoped to use his authority as head of the Department of Interior to change the 
policy of segregation within CCC camps located on National Park Service property.
In a letter to Fechner, Ickes requested that the CCC director help “arrange for the 
appointment of colored Superintendents and Foremen in some of the camps that are 
manned by colored enrollees.” Upon receiving the note, Fechner quickly penned a 
response, arguing instead that “from all the information available, I seriously doubt if
23 Camp NM-1 Inspection Report, 10 March 1934, “Virginia NM-1” file, Box 134, Records 
of the Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, MD; 
Camp NM-2 Inspection Report, 10 March 1934, “Virginia NM-2” file, Box 134, Records of 
the Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, MD; 
Camp NM-3 Inspection Report, 10 March 1934, “Virginia NM-3” file, Box 135, Records of 
the Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, MD; 
Camp NM-4 Inspection Report, 10 March 1934, “Virginia NM-4” file, Box 135, Records of 
the Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, MD; 
Newport News Daily Press. 14 May 1933, 1; Newport News Daily Press. 18 May 1933, 6; 
Newport News Daily Press. 20 June 1933, 3; Newport News Daily Press. 3 December 1933, 
4-5.
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the appointment of negro [sic] supervisory personnel could be successfully 
undertaken,” and any such action might prove to be a “definite menace to the success 
that we have achieved.”24
Ickes, however, disagreed, and responded with a strongly worded defense of 
integration:
I have your letter of September 24 in which you express doubt as to 
the advisability of appointing Negro supervisory personnel in Negro 
CCC camps. For my part, I am quite certain that Negroes can function 
in supervisory capacities just as efficiently as can white men and I do 
not think that they should be discriminated against merely on account 
of their color. I can see no menace to the program that you are so 
efficiently carrying out in giving just and proper recognition to 
members of the Negro race.25 
Meanwhile, throughout this exchange, Ickes corresponded with Roosevelt, 
encouraging him to become personally involved in the matter. On September 27, the 
President responded by sending a hastily prepared, hand-written message to 
Fechner’s office, in which Roosevelt asked the director to place black foremen “in the 
Park Service CCC camps, where the boys are colored.” Upon receiving the note,
24 Harold Ickes to Robert Fechner, 20 September 1935, “CCC Negro Foremen” file, Box 700, 
General Correspondence of the Director, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, 
MD; Robert Fechner to Harold Ickes, 24 September 1935, “CCC Negro Foremen” file, Box 
700, General Correspondence of the Director, Record Group 35, National Archives, College 
Park, MD. For a broader analysis of Harold Ickes’s views on racial discrimination see Nancy 
Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln. 51-53,158-159; Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hone: 
Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1996), 112-114; Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as 
a National Issue (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 67-69.
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Fechner did nothing. He refused to act on the request until the President could be 
properly warned about the possible backlash from local politicians and residents.26
Two weeks later, Ickes became frustrated with the CCC director’s inaction 
and demanded an explanation. Fechner finally scheduled a meeting with Roosevelt 
and explained that any such change in policy would lead to considerable displeasure 
in CCC camp communities throughout the country—not just in the South. The 
minutes of the meeting are unavailable, but it appears that, according to a brief 
summary prepared by Fechner, the two struck an agreement to promote only fifteen 
black enrollees to non-technical foremen positions in black CCC camps located on 
National Park Service properties. The plan was about to be placed into action when 
the information somehow leaked to congressional representatives and local politicians
97m Yorktown, Virginia.
The source of the leak remains unclear, but it appears that the person carefully 
selected the recipients of his or her information. The most significant recipient was
25 Harold Ickes to Robert Fechner, 26 September 1935, “CCC Negro Foremen” file, Box 700, 
General Correspondence of the Director, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, 
MD.
26 Franklin Roosevelt to Robert Fechner, 27 September 1935, “CCC Negro Foremen” file, 
Box 700, General Correspondence of the Director, Record Group 35, National Archives, 
College Park, MD; Robert Fechner to Harold Ickes, 26 September 1935, “CCC Negro 
Foremen” file, Box 700, General Correspondence of the Director, Record Group 35, National 
Archives, College Park, MD.
27 Robert Fechner to Harry Byrd, 21 October 1935, “CCC Negro Foremen” file, Box 700, 
General Correspondence of the Director, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, 
MD. My discussion of Roosevelt’s intervention is a significant divergence from the existing 
scholarship on the CCC. Salmond, New Deal Case Study, and Olen Cole, The African 
American Experience in the Civilian Conservation Corps (Gainesville: University of Florida 
Press, 1999) both argue that Roosevelt adamantly backed the demands of the War 
Department; my evidence suggests that Roosevelt, at least for a time, was convinced by Ickes 
to experiment by placing a small number of black supervisors in black CCC camps. My 
upcoming dissertation will show that Ickes’s efforts were finally rewarded in 1937 when 
Roosevelt approved the appointment of an all-black supervisory staff to a Gettyburg,
Harry F. Byrd, a Democratic senator from Virginia. By 1935, Byrd and several of his 
southern counterparts in the Senate were beginning to express their frustration with 
Roosevelt’s New Deal programs. A year later, they would formally coalesce into a 
solidly anti-New Deal voting block that drastically circumscribed Roosevelt’s ability 
to pass social legislation through Congress. News of any change in the CCC’s 
segregation policy, particularly within a Virginia camp, would have certainly raised 
the ire of Senator Byrd.
In a letter to Senator Byrd and the Governor of Virginia George Perry, S. A. 
Curtis, president of the First National Bank of Yorktown and an active community 
leader, claimed that an order “has been issued to replace all white foremen,” which 
would have a dire effect on civil disobedience; because, as Curtis argued “the 
population in the immediate vicinity of these camps is about 75 percent Negro.” 
Believing that it was “hard enough now to maintain order with the limited police 
protection obtainable in rural sections, Curtis felt that “turning these 800 additional 
Negroes loose without white supervision” would be “a very serious menace to the 
lives and properties of every citizen of the lower peninsula.” In a direct political 
threat, he stated, “Of late years the voters in Warwick, York, and James City counties, 
which are affected, have shown strong Republican leanings in national elections, and 
it is my opinion that if this order is not changed all three counties will refuse to 
support Democratic nominees.”29
Pennsylvania CCC camp. My evidence suggests that Ickes personally chose the Gettysburg 
camp site to prove a point to southern congressman that had thwarted his earlier efforts.
28 For an excellent account of Virginia politics during the New Deal consult Ronald 
Heinemann, Harry Bvrd of Virginia (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1996).
29 S.A. Curtis to Harry F. Byrd, 24 October 1935, “Federal CCC” file, Box 16, GCP. It 
should be noted that Curtis’s population statistics are tremendously inflated, even when
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Another prominent Yorktown citizen, A.J. Renforth, seconded Curtis’s plea, 
warning that with “only one county police officer and one sheriff to keep order” the 
situation could possibly become a “great menace.” For Renforth, the white foremen 
were a powerful control element, and if trouble were someday to arise, the foremen 
could be used as “peace officers.” Renforth then reiterated Curtis’s political threat by 
claiming that the removal of white foremen would be “a very dangerous thing” and 
“certainly not a vote getter for the Democratic Party.”30
State officials and Yorktown residents were also cognizant that the 
appointment of black supervisors would jeopardize the well-paid leadership positions 
held solely by white men. In addition, to the camp commanders, the National Park 
Service received funds to hire 24 local men with experience in road and building 
construction. These men, commonly referred to as local experienced men or LEM’s, 
supervised the park’s various work sites and the activities of the enrollees in the field. 
All of the LEM’s at Yorktown lived in the area around the park. Many had owned 
their own contracting firms, but business virtually ceased during the Depression. The 
CCC offered them consistent employment at reasonable wages. The appointment of 
black supervisors would have led to the dismissal of the park’s white LEM’s. The 
loss of white jobs and the perceived federal acquiescence in breeching southern labor 
practices further fueled the concern of local citizens.
Upon receiving the news in his office, Congressman Schuyler Otis Bland, 
who represented Yorktown in Congress, contacted the offices of several southern
counting the 800 black men in the camps, African-Americans composed only 43% of the 
population in York County. United States Census Bureau, 19th Census of the United States. 
190-191.
30 A.J. Renforth to Harry F. Byrd, 24 October 1935, “Federal CCC” file, Box 16, GCP.
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senators, all o f whom were outraged—many filing their protests with the President. 
Senator Byrd personally telegraphed the President about the matter, and then wrote to 
Governor Peery claiming, “I feel certain now that this matter will be adjusted 
satisfactorily.” Upon returning to Washington from his presidential retreat in Warm 
Springs, Georgia, Roosevelt assured the Virginia delegation that the white foremen 
would not be replaced.31
The flurry of letters generated by Yorktown citizens illustrates the dependence 
of local white citizens on the perception of white control of black labor. When 
overseen by white supervisors, black men could be “held in check.” The introduction 
of black foremen seriously challenged the social status quo and directly threatened 
coveted skilled labor positions available only to local whites. With white authority in 
place, the camp was a model town institution. But if the perception of white control 
of black labor were compromised, the camp would become a powerful symbol of 
federal acquiescence in challenging Jim Crow. S.A. Curtis said as much, declaring 
“This is not a protest against present conditions. If the white men are left in charge, I 
think everything will continue to the satisfaction of our people.”32 Thus, the black 
CCC camps in Yorktown were widely accepted by the local white community, but 
that acceptance lay solely on the continued enforcement of segregation and the 
preservation of skilled positions for white workers in the park.
Historians have traditionally attributed the CCC’s segregationist policy to 
decisions made by leaders of the organization at the national level. Although this is
31 L.R. O’Hara to George Peery, 24 October 1935, “Federal CCC” file, Box 16, GCP; Harry
F. Byrd to George Peery, 4 November 1935, “Federal CCC” file, Box 16, GCP.
certainly true, those decisions were dictated by events at the state and local level. 
White residents feared that blacks supervisors would replace white workers in the 
most highly paid positions available in the CCC. The NAACP, black newspaper 
editors, and one prominent figure in the Administration attempted to craft an 
alternative approach that would have included placing African Americans in 
supervisory positions in black camps. Although Fechner was forced to respond to 
their pleas, he believed that appointing black supervisors would unsettle local 
communities and jeopardize the future of black camps throughout the CCC. In this 
context, Fechner’s directive against the appointment of black leaders was merely a 
formal endorsement of a decision already made by the white citizens of Yorktown.
32 S.A. Curtis to Harry F. Byrd, 24 October 1935, “Federal CCC” file, Box 16, GCP.
CHAPTER II 
BLACK TEACHERS IN BLACK SCHOOLS: 
A PROGRAM OF EDUCATION IN THE CCC
Much as historians have underestimated the power of local communities in 
shaping CCC policy, their examinations of black responses to that policy have 
focused overwhelmingly on national black organizations such as the NAACP. Lost 
in their narratives is an understanding of the powerful critique of CCC policy that 
took place at the local level. The strongest arguments against discrimination in the 
CCC, like the most vehement arguments supporting it, originated locally. In 
Yorktown, two local black elites—one a university president and the other a life 
insurance salesman—built an educational program which became a model for the 
entire CCC and argued successfully for the appointment of black educators to CCC 
camps. Their pleas coincided with the separate but equal legal strategy of the 
NAACP and a newly interested Democratic Party in search for black votes. The 
enrolled men at Yorktown, despite their long hours of difficult work, enthusiastically 
embraced the camps’ educational programs and helped determine the types of classes 
offered within the camps. The efforts of local black elites and the Yorktown 
enrollees prove convincingly that African Americans in Yorktown played an active 
role in manipulating the CCC’s policy of segregation.1
1 John A. Salmond, “The Civilian Conservation Corps and the Negro,” Journal of American 
History 52 (June 1965): 75-88; George P. Rawick, “The New Deal and Youth: The CCC, 
NYA, and the American Youth Congress,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1957. 
The best example of an overemphasis on national black organizations is Olen Cole, The 
African American Experience in the Civilian Conservation Corns (Gainesville: University of 
Florida Press, 1999). Cole offers a thorough analysis of NAACP’s efforts in California, but
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Education played an important role in the Yorktown camps from their 
inception. Shortly after the camps began operation, camp commanders invited 
rangers from the National Park Service to deliver weekly lectures on topics related to 
the park. Thus, enrollees were treated to talks on topics ranging from the history of 
the Virginia Tidewater region to the employment of newly developed erosion control 
techniques. Enrollees also watched National Park Service informational films with 
such mundane titles as “Life History of the Mosquito,” “Preparing for a Garden,” and 
“The Story of Bakelite Resnoid.” All enrollees were required to attend the lectures 
and films. The sessions served an educational function, but enrollees found them 
“boring.” National Park Service officials discussed creating a more formal education 
program, but the idea floundered when no one within the park surfaced to direct the 
activities.2
The development of a formal education program in the Yorktown camps was 
a direct result of the efforts of a black Yorktown resident and the enthusiastic support 
of the enrollees. Hughes A. Robinson, an insurance salesman for Prudential Life 
Insurance, moved to the Yorktown area from Bordentown, New Jersey, where he had
he never ties their efforts back to local communities around the camps or the enrollees 
themselves. Cole’s work leads one to believe that the only African Americans protesting 
CCC policy were members of the NAACP. My approach to local efforts draws upon Charles 
Payne’s research on the Mississippi civil rights struggles in the 1950’s. Charles Payne, I’ve 
Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). Payne argues that the civil rights struggle in 
Mississippi can only be understood when analyzed at the ground level. National 
organizations entering Mississippi in the 1960’s built on a legacy of local resistance. That 
context served to bolster or circumscribe any activity that took place in Mississippi. I believe 
that a complete history of African American involvement in the CCC must utilize the same 
approach. In the CCC, local black elites and individual enrollees reinforced and gave birth to 
a national critique of the agency’s policy toward African Americans.
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led an urban education program for African American youth financed by a 
philanthropic local bank owner. During the banking crisis of 1932, the bank was 
forced to close, and the educational program lost its funding. When he visited the 
CCC camps at Yorktown, Robinson believed he could emulate his earlier education 
promotion efforts, by establishing a program at the camps.
Camp commanders were initially reluctant to allow a black educator into their 
ranks. They feared that Robinson’s presence would be viewed by the local 
population as one step on a slippery slope leading to black supervisors. Ultimately, 
their decision to support Robinson’s program was based on prevailing educational 
practice in Virginia.
The Yorktown CCC camp commanders did not have to look very far to realize 
that black students in Virginia attended segregated, all-black schools that were 
usually taught by black teachers. In 1938, of the 583,556 children enrolled in the 
state’s public school system, 154,330 or 26.5 percent were African American. The 
total value of white school property in the state totaled $57 million, black school 
property was valued at only $7 million. The state expended $26.23 per student to 
educate white children and only $16.04 for black children. Funding discrepancies 
were most readily apparent when comparing teacher salaries. In 1938, the average 
yearly salary for a white teacher in the state was $864, whereas black teachers 
commanded only $558. Black students additionally suffered from substandard 
educational facilities. Of the 1,695 school buildings open to black students, 1,616
2 Superintendent Monthly Report, June 1933, Records of the Colonial National Historical 
Park, 7; Ye Olde York Times. 20 March 1936, 2.
3 Lloyd H. Lewis to George Zook, 25 December 1933, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC 
Records, Arthur Howe Papers, Hampton University, Hampton, VA (AHP).
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were one-room, wooden buildings and 1,019 of those consisted of only one teacher.
64 of the 100 counties in Virginia had no high schools for black students to attend, as 
such, few black students attended school beyond the age of 14. What little funds 
were available to black schools in Virginia often came from philanthropic white 
businessmen such as John F. Slater and Julius Rosenwald or through fundraising 
efforts organized by local black citizens. The prevailing racial segregation in 
Virginia’s public schools led camp commanders to believe that Robinson would not 
pose a threat to local acceptance.4
Robinson’s program began much like public school efforts throughout the 
state. He taught a weekly course on basic grammar in a dilapidated park building that 
served as a one-room schoolhouse. Robinson, lacking any CCC funds for educational 
materials and working without any payment for his activities, used textbooks from his 
own collection. Reports published by the CCC’s central information office suggest 
that roughly one in ten black CCC enrollees from Virginia were unable to read upon 
entering the camps, and less than twenty percent had completed the seventh grade or 
higher.5 One of Robinson’s first students, Charlie Irvine, a World War I veteran from 
Newark, New Jersey, penned a thank you letter to Robinson in which he wrote, “I 
came to the CCC in January. I could not read or write. Thank you for teaching me.
4 Lloyd H. Lewis to George Zook, 25 December 1933, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC 
Records, AHP; Works Projects Administration of Virginia, The Negro in Virginia (Winston 
Salem, North Carolina: John F. Blair Inc., 1994), 299-302.
5 Edgar G. Brown, “The Civilian Conservation Corps and Colored Youth,” “Negro Relations” 
file, Box 1, General Correspondence, Records of the Division of Planning and Public 
Relations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, MD.
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Signed, Charlie Irvine.” It was the first time Charlie Irvine had ever signed his own 
name.6
The enrolled men embraced Robinson’s classes immediately despite their 
exhausting work activities. The average enrollee’s day began with a call to reveille at 
6:00 A.M. The men then had thirty minutes to wash and dress before breakfast.
After breakfast, the men spent another 50 minutes “making their beds, cleaning their 
bunks, and mopping the floors.” Commanders inspected each bunk and rated its 
cleanliness. At 8:00, the men fell into formation in the common area outside of the 
bunks, and checked in with their assistant leaders— skilled enrollees that helped the 
all-white technical foreman coordinate work activities. The leaders then reported to 
their camp commanders and listed any absent enrollees. After check-in, the men 
were “given the order ‘left face’ and marched out to the service road where trucks 
were waiting to take them to work.”7
Most of the CCC work activities in the park were physically exhausting. To 
give one example, Roy Jones, nicknamed Pinhead by his fellow enrollees, was a 
member of the camp’s 25-man tree transplantation crew. Colonial National Park 
employees identified trees throughout the park to be moved to the area around the 
scenic highway under construction between Yorktown and Jamestown. They placed 
a flag in front of each tree and traced a line surrounding the tree to mark the outer 
limits of the tree’s root bulb. Two enrollees were then assigned to each tree to begin 
digging a circle around the roots. After they finished digging out all of the dirt
6 Camp NM-4 Inspection Report, 24 May 1939, “Virginia NM-4” file, Box 134, Records of 
the Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, MD.
7 Camp NM-1 Narrative Report, 15 May 1934, “NM-2” file, Box 74, Records of the Land and 
Recreational Planning Division, Record Group 79, National Archives, College Park, MD.
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around the bulb, two more enrollees called “shapers” cut the remaining roots and 
covered the root bulb with burlap. After the shapers finished their work, another 
group of enrollees known as “the bull gang” went into the hole and pulled the trees 
over to place a wooden platform under them. The technical foreman selected the 
members of the bull gang “principally for the strength of their backs.” Jones was a 
member of the Camp NM-2 bull gang. These men often lifted dogwood trees over 20 
feet in height that “could weigh over 1500 pounds.” After the wooden platform was 
secured under the tree, another group of four enrollees placed two wooden or steel 
planks that led to the bed of a large truck. The wooden platform underneath the tree 
was then attached to a steel wench, which slowly pulled the tree up the planks and 
onto the bed of a service truck. As each set of enrollees completed their tasks, they
• • Qimmediately repeated the entire process for any surrounding marked trees.
The enrollees’ work schedule included little time for breaks. They originally 
returned to camp at 12:00 for lunch, but the commanders believed that “too much 
time [was] lost transporting them back to camp.” The commanders then outfitted a 
“chow truck” that delivered hot meals to the enrollees in the field. The commanders 
reported “an hour for lunch was tried and proved unsatisfactory as the men just 
played around, got lost in the woods, and were completely out of any notion of 
working after an hours rest.” The commanders refined the lunch break by reducing 
the duration of the break to thirty minutes and announcing the end of the break with a 
loud whistle. Thus, enrollees working in the field received only one thirty-minute 
break in their entire workday.9
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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The men returned to their camps at approximately 4:00 each evening. They 
spent the next hour showering and preparing their bunks for evening inspection. At 
5:00, the men formed lines in front of the camps’ flagpoles and participated in a flag 
retreat ceremony. The men then fell out of formation and gathered in the mess hall 
for dinner. At 6:00, their official duties were complete and they had the choice to 
relax in the recreation hall with their friends or spend an hour in Robinson’s classes. 
Although Jones and his fellow enrollees were often exhausted from their work, over 
60% of the enrollees participated in Robinson’s evening classes.10
After the first month of classes, enrollees urged Robinson to expand his 
educational offerings. They wanted more vocational courses that would help them 
secure employment after leaving the CCC. Some of the enrollees expressed their 
frustration that the work they performed at the park had little practical application 
outside of the CCC. One enrollee complained directly to his camp commander that 
“there [was] no future in dragging brush.” Robinson did not have the financial or 
physical resources to offer vocational classes on his own. With the full support of the 
Yorktown camp commanders, Robinson contacted officials at Hampton Institute, an 
all-black college located roughly thirty minutes from the camp, to ask for additional 
supplies and expertise. Arthur Howe, the president of Hampton Institute, admired 
Robinson’s zeal and directed a member of his staff to “help Mr. Robinson organize 
courses in reading, writing, arithmetic, and the trades.”11
10 Camp NM-2 Investigation Reports, 10 March 1934, “Virginia NM-2” file, Box 134, 
Records of the Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College 
Park, MD.
11 Arthur Howe to George Zook, 11 December 1933, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC Records, 
AHP.
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Hampton Institute’s participation in the educational programs of the 
Yorktown camps radically changed the type of classes available to enrollees.
Although Hampton was in the process of changing its image from a vocational school 
to a nationally known black college offering a diverse curriculum, the campus still 
housed a wide array of facilities featuring equipment designed for trade instruction. 
Hampton’s carpentry, woodworking, automobile repair, and welding classrooms were 
the some of the best in the nation. Arthur Howe made his facilities and instructors 
available to the enrollees at Yorktown. The camp commanders paid for buses that 
transported the men to class, and Hampton provided free instruction.12
Robinson, drawing upon his physical education training at Springfield 
College, also introduced a recreational program. Working on the weekends,
Robinson and the enrollees built a baseball field and a basketball court. Each camp 
fielded a team to compete in the often heated inter-camp athletic rivalries. These 
backyard battles helped build camp allegiances, not unlike those generated by 
modern-day college athletic programs. As the men cheered and competed for their 
respective camps, they formed a group identity that added immeasurably to camp 
morale—a fact not lost on the camp commanders.13
Word of the educational activities at Yorktown reached Robert Fechner’s 
office in November of 1933. After meeting with his advisory staff, including officials 
from the Department of Education, the Department of Interior, and the Army,
12 Francis Peabody, Education for Life: The Story of Hampton Institute (New York: Ayer Co. 
Publishing, 1991), 45-69; Camp NM-2 Investigation Reports, 10 March 1934, “Virginia NM- 
2” file, Box 134, Records of the Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National 
Archives, College Park, MD.
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Fechner developed basic guidelines for a CCC program of education. The primary 
goal of the program would be “returning to the normal work-a-day world, upon 
completion of the emergency relief project, citizens better equipped mentally and 
morally for their duties as such and with a better knowledge of the government under 
which they live.” Officials hoped that CCC enrollees would be able to leave their 
camps and find gainful employment utilizing the skills they had garnered in CCC 
programs.14
Like the rest of the CCC, the educational program was a hastily constructed 
institution. The program was first and foremost under the auspices of the War 
Department. Because of their prominent role in the camps, camp commanders were 
given oversight control at the local level. On the national level, the War Department 
appointed one educational coordinator for each Army corps area. These men 
developed implementation procedures and served as liaisons between local 
commanders in the field and the War Department bureaucracy. The Office of 
Education, working with the Department of Interior, was charged with “the selection 
and appointment of camp educational advisors,” along with the development of 
“instruction outlines, teaching procedures, and types of teaching materials for use in 
the camps.” Thus, the Office of Education selected the men and outlined a
13 Lloyd H. Lewis to George Zook, 25 December 1933, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC 
Records, AHP. While a student at Springfield College, Robinson enrolled in several classes 
taught by Professor John Naismith—the inventor of basketball.
14 Ye Olde York Times. 30 March 1935. 5: Yorktown Sentinel and Review, 15 May 1935,4; 
United States Department of the Interior Office of Education, A Handbook for the 
Educational Advisers in the Civilian Conservation Corps (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1934), 1.
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curriculum, while the War Department assumed a supervisory role of the program in 
each individual camp.15
The first allocation of educational advisors was set to take place in December 
1934. Based on Robinson’s success at Yorktown, the commanders of the Yorktown 
camps lobbied aggressively on his behalf. The commander of Camp NM-4, in a letter 
to George Zook, the commissioner of CCC education, wrote “On the basis of 
previous results obtained by Mr. Robinson in our educational work, you may rest 
assured that his appointment [as an educational advisor] will meet with the approval 
of all concerned. He has given his services and time freely, day and night, and we 
shall be very appreciative of your kind consideration in making this appointment.” 
The commanding officers of camps NM-1 and NM-2 echoed his comments, claiming 
that Robinson “deserves recognition,” and that “no position in this new educational 
program will be too much for his ability.” The commanders of the Yorktown camps 
respected Robinson’s efforts on behalf of the enrollees, and hoped that his 
appointment might ease the implementation of the new education program.16
Unfortunately, the praise of Yorktown’s camp commanders ran counter to the 
strict racial policies of the War Department. When the first group of educational 
advisers was announced, not a single African American appeared on the list. Arthur 
Howe expressed his outrage at this poor result. He had hoped that the CCC’s 
educational program would offer employment opportunities for several of his recent
15 United States Department of the Interior Office of Education, A Handbook. 2. The best 
review of the administrative structure of the CCC’s education program is Charles Price 
Harper. The Administration of the Civilian Conservation Corps (Clarksburg, WV: Clarksburg 
Publishing Company, 1939).
16 Lloyd H. Lewis to George Zook, 25 December 1933, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC 
Records, AHP.
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graduates. Demanding an explanation, he penned an angry letter to the 
Commissioner of Education. Commissioner Zook’s prompt reply confirmed what 
Howe and Robinson had assumed, “after consulting the Corps Area Commanders of 
the Army, we were advised.. . .  that it would be best to appoint only white Camp 
Educational Advisors.”17 Clark Foreman, a friend of Arthur Howe and Harold 
Ickes’s personal assistant on racial matters, discovered that Zook was actually in \ 
favor of the appointment of black education advisors, but that his appeals were 
shunned by the Army and the director of the CCC, Robert Fechner. It looked as 
though the CCC would once again deny blacks equal access to leadership positions 
within the organization.18
Robinson and Howe, working with various state and local civil rights 
organizations, attempted to illustrate the absurdity of the CCC’s decision to exclude 
African Americans from the program’s educational positions. Howe insisted, “where 
a dual education system prevails, justice demands the appointment of qualified 
Negroes as educational advisors in Negro CCC camps.” Robinson made a similar 
argument, positing, “colored men understand the colored enrollees better than anyone 
else.” Both men attempted to recast the argument that Robinson had used so 
effectively to gamer initial support for his educational program at Yorktown. If ^  
officials from the CCC or the War Department accepted the fundamental
17 George Zook to Arthur Howe, 10 March 1934, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC Records, 
AHP.
18 Clark Foreman to Arthur Howe, 8 March 1934, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC Records, 
AHP.
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underpinnings of segregation, then it made perfect sense to appoint black education 
advisors in all-black camps.19
The “separate but equal” argument espoused by Howe and Robinson mirrored 
the NAACP’s court strategy at the time. In 1934, Charles Houston, the Dean of 
Howard University Law School, and his promising student Thurgood Marshall began 
carefully selecting cases that involved racial inequality at graduate schools throughout 
the South. According to historian Richard Kluger, the NAACP legal team decided 
“not to attack the constitutionality of segregation itself, but to challenge its legality as 
it was practiced by showing that nothing remotely approaching equal educational 
opportunities was offered blacks in segregating states.” There was certainly no 
pretense of separate but equal in southern graduate schools, because no facilities 
existed for black professional education in any of the southern states. The NAACP’s 
first success came in a case involving the University of Maryland Law School.
Donald Murray, a black Amherst graduate, was denied admission to the school based 
solely on race. Marshall argued before the Maryland Court of Appeals that the state’s 
provision for out-of-state tuition grants did not constitute equality of treatment under 
the law. The court agreed and instructed the state to establish a separate law school 
for blacks in the state or admit Murray into the existing school. In the fall of 1936,
19 Arthur Howe to George Zook, 4 March 1934, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC Records,
AHP; Hughes Robinson to Walter White, 24 March 1934, Records of the NAACP: Peonage. 
Labor and the New Deal. 1913-1939 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 
1990), frame 191. The best brief evaluation of racial segregation in the South is still C. Vann 
Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).
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Murray became the first black law student at Maryland’s previously all-white law 
school.20
The segregation appeals of Howard and Robinson also garnered 
overwhelming support from the Virginia Commission on Interracial Cooperation 
(CIC). Although little has been written about the CIC, it played an important early 
role in the facilitation of racial dialogue among white liberals and black elites in the 
Upper South.21 Composed primarily of prominent white businessmen from Norfolk 
and Richmond, the Virginia CIC viewed the CCC educational advisor campaign as 
tailor-made for its own advocacy program. The director of the Virginia CIC, L.R. 
Reynolds, corresponded frequently with Arthur Howe on the matter and offered the 
full assistance of his organization. Borrowing the segregation arguments of both 
Howe and Robinson, Reynolds penned a letter to the Office of Education asking that 
“Negro leadership be given consideration in making assignments to Negro camps.” 
Rather than addressing his argument directly, Clarence Marsh, an official in the 
Office of Education, replied that no black education advisors had been appointed in 
the state because none had applied. This problem was remedied when Robinson, with 
the help of Howe and several prominent black leaders, distributed information 
packets describing the CCC educational appointments to over 100 hundred African-
20 Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black 
America’s Struggle for Equality (New York: Random House, 1977), 21-36; Harvard Sitkoff, 
A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1978), 186-187.
21 Despite the paucity of scholarly monographs on the history of the CIC, the organization 
receives a bit of attention in the work of Patricia Sullivan and Nancy Weiss; Patricia Sullivan, 
Davs of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1996), 32-35; Nancy Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics 
in the Age of F.D.R. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 68-69.
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Americans deemed qualified for the positions. The Office of Education responded 
with a wall of silence.22
No person had more reason to be furious with the CCC’s decision than 
Hughes Robinson. He had labored since October to build an educational and 
recreational program that became a model for the CCC’s own education plan, but was 
then told he was not qualified for the job based on his skin color. He responded by 
writing a description of the CCC’s decision to Walter White at the NAACP, and to 
every major black newspaper in the United States.23 His letter engaged White, 
because the question of black educational advisors fit well within the NAACP’s new 
legal strategy and its efforts to engage the federal government.
In 1934, Roosevelt’s campaign managers urged the Democratic Party to make 
overtures to black voters. Most African Americans were disfranchised in the South 
and blacks composed only a small minority of the electorate in the North. However, 
the Bureau of the Census estimated that 400,000 blacks left the South from 1930 to 
1940. The black population in eight states—Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, 
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania—increased by 291,600. These eight 
states represented 202 of the 212 electoral votes needed to win the presidency. 
Although the black voting population was still relatively small, the Democratic Party 
now regarded it as important.24
22 L.R. Reynolds to Clarence Marsh, 5 March 1934, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC Records, 
AHP; L.R. Reynolds to Arthur Howe, 6 March 1934, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC Records, 
AHP; Hughes Robinson to Walter White, 8 March 1934, Records of the NAACP. frames 
184-185.
23 Hughes Robinson to Walter White, 12 March 1934, Records of the NAACP. frame 186.
24 United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1960), 46-47.
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Both parties actively sought the black vote in the year preceding the 1936 
election. For the first time, both parties advertised in black newspapers. Democrats 
initiated a number of firsts at their 1936 national convention; they seated ten black 
delegates, twenty-two black reporters were allowed to take seats in the regular press 
box, and the party scheduled a press conference for the black media. The Democratic 
Party, unlike the Republicans, attempted to aggressively send a message of openness 
to African Americans. The NAACP and other black elites responded with a massive 
letter-writing campaign to the President and the black press, outlining the 
discrimination in the CCC and other New Deal programs.25
The powerful appeals of Howe and Robinson, the public denunciations of the , 
CCC in the black press, and the Democratic Party’s new initiative to gain black 
voters, led the Administration to reconsider opening educational appointments to 
African Americans in all-black CCC camps. George Zook quietly contacted the 
presidents of several historically black higher institutions, including Howe, to gain 
assistance in locating qualified black applicants. Howe contacted several close 
associates and asked them to list five qualified applicants. After receiving their 
responses, he sent the information to Zook, who then selected several of the 
candidates for placement in the CCC. For Howe, the CCC’s change of direction 
offered him a prominent role in the allocation of CCC educational advisor positions 
and a voice in the educational programs of all-black CCC camps throughout the 
Tidewater region. Hampton Institute’s participation segued with the school’s new
25Weiss. Farewell to the Party of Lincoln. 136-157, 180-209.
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emphasis on educational training programs. It also led to a considerable boost in 
prestige for Hampton and a vital infusion of federal relief funds.26
In a sad turn of events, Robinson’s application for employment was turned 
down by the Office of Education. His vocal denunciations of prominent officials at 
the Office of Education and the War Department certainly sealed his fate. Robinson, 
in a letter to Thomas G. Bennett, educational director for the Third Corps area, 
commented that “he was well aware of the reason why my application was not 
approved.. . .  I realize that I may have done something that was not pleasing to Dr. 
Marsh [the Army’s leading advisor to the CCC education program].” Despite his 
appeals, the CCC refused to offer Robinson employment during the first enrollment 
period for black education advisors. He watched as a young educator from 
Pennsylvania assumed control of his program in Yorktown.27
Incapable of removing himself from the issue of black involvement in New 
Deal programs, Robinson attempted to establish what he called “a Bureau of 
Information and Clearing House.” He felt that “colored men take much for granted” 
and fail to “make applications for certain government positions.” The proposed 
Bureau of Information would publish job openings in national, state, and local 
governments, enabling “thousands of men and women to find employment in places 
that were once closed to them in our national life.” Possibly drawing on his own 
experience with the CCC, he proposed that the organization not “arouse the emotions
26 Arthur Howe to Richard Bowling, 21 March 1934, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC Records, 
AHP; George Zook to Arthur Howe, 27 March 1934, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC Records, 
AHP; L.F. Palmer to Arthur Howe, 23 March 1934, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC Records, 
AHP; M.E. Davis to Arthur Howe, 26 March 1934, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC Records, 
AHP.
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of the" people.” Rather than publicly demanding more government job opportunities, 
the Bureau of Information would simply inform African Americans about the 
numerous positions that came available, whether they were open to blacks or not. 
Robinson hoped that this growing awareness would increase the participation of 
African Americans in government and blunt the “No blacks applied” argument often 
expressed by government officials when explaining why blacks were excluded from 
various positions. Robinson gained the support of Norfolk Journal and Guide editor 
P.B. Young, but failed to move the organization past the initial planning stage.
In the summer of 1935, Robinson made one final plea to the Office of 
Education. In order to gain support for his application, Robinson wrote a desperate 
letter to his former companion Arthur Howe. He fondly recalled “the success we had 
in getting President Roosevelt to appoint 100 black advisors.” Expressing his 
frustration, Robinson stated, “It falls on the shoulders of one to fight, and on others to 
reap the benefits acquired.” He wanted one final favor from Howe; a “kind letter to 
Dr. Thomas G. Bennett, Educational Advisor for the Third Corps Area” asking him
90“to appoint me as supervisor for colored camps in Virginia.” Howe, who was now 
an important consultant to the CCC’s black education program, refused to risk 
angering the administrators at the Office of Education by lauding the 
accomplishments of Hughes Robinson. Howe contacted Bennett as Robinson
27 Hughes Robinson to Thomas Bennett, 1 August 1934, “CCC 1935” file, Box 1, CCC 
Records, AHP.
28 Hughes Robinson to Walter White, 10 August 1934, Records of the NAACP. frames 197- 
199.
29 Hughes Robinson to Arthur Howe, 26 July 1935, “CCC 1935” file, Box 1, CCC Records, 
AHP.
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requested; but in the letter, he claimed that he had only met Robinson “one or two 
times” and that he knew “very little about his career or abilities.” 30
In Robinson’s absence, the Yorktown camps and Hampton Institute became 
an epicenter for the CCC’s black education program. On August 7, 1935, the Third 
Corps area of the CCC (compromising Virginia, Maryland, Washington, D.C., and 
Pennsylvania) held a two-week training session for newly appointed black education 
advisors on the campus of Hampton Institute. In his opening address, Robert Fechner 
insisted that the intent of the conference was “the development of the advisor and the 
stimulation of interest which will be carried back to each camp and show itself in the
-i -i
betterment of each camp education program.”
The content presented during the conference’s twelve sessions laid the 
groundwork for the essential components of the CCC’s program. The first two 
sessions featured talks entitled “Educational Activities in the CCC” and “Camp 
Educational Problems,” which focused on literacy and civic awareness. The 
overwhelming majority of the training sessions, however, dealt with vocational 
issues. Programs such as “The Individual and the World of Work,” left no doubts 
about the intended end result of the CCC’s program—“to direct the individual 
enrollee toward a job consistent with his ability.” The new advisors were encouraged
30 Arthur Howe to Thomas Bennett, 5 August 1935, “CCC 1935” file, Box 1, CCC Records, 
AHP; Arthur Howe to George Zook, 11 December 1933, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC 
Records, AHP.
31 The minutes from the Hampton education conference are contained in a bulletin entitled 
“The Adviser,” a copy of which is located in Thomas Bennett to Arthur Howe, 16 August 
1935, “CCC 1935” file, Box 1, CCC Records, AHP. Fechner’ comments can be found on 
page 4.
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to hold mock job interviews and develop basic job training programs, all in an effort > 
to move the men off of public relief rolls.32
In Yorktown, each of the four camps received its own educational advisor.
Each advisor developed classes, provided classroom instruction, coordinated 
activities with local schools and universities, oversaw the camp’s recreation program, 
and served as a liaison between enrollees and the camp commanders. The advisors 
were helped in their activities by an assistant educational advisor also appointed by 
the Office of Education. The duties undertaken by the CCC educational advisors 
were virtually identical to those earlier assumed by Robinson. However, the 
involvement and oversight of the CCC fundamentally changed the education program 
at Yorktown in two ways: it provided more money for classes at Hampton and 
charged the advisors with helping the enrollees “find gainful employment following 
their service in the CCC.”33
The infusion of capital to support the CCC’s educational efforts led to an even 
larger role for Hampton in the Yorktown CCC camps. The school dispatched 
students from its education program twice a week to offer high-school level grammar, 
history, and mathematics courses. The number of vocational offerings expanded to 
include woodworking, table waiting, food preparation, and bricklaying. The advisors 
urged the men to participate in the classes, but they were not required to attend. An 
official enrollee handbook stated “the idea behind the program is not that of
32 W.A. Avery to Arthur Howe, 21 August 1935, “CCC 1935” file, Box 1, CCC Records, 
AHP.
33 Charles Price Harper. The Administration of the Civilian Conservation Corps. 20-42; 
Arthur Howe to George Zook, 11 December 1933, “CCC 1934” file, Box 1, CCC Records, 
AHP.
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cramming education down the throats of enrollees . . .  it is that of giving the boys who 
come into camp something of value.”
The list of vocational courses available in Yorktown illustrated the types of 
positions that were open to African Americans during the 1930’s. They were also the 
courses most requested in surveys conducted among the Yorktown enrollees. These 
so-called “Negro jobs” may have carried a negative racial stigma, but as historian 
Nancy Weiss argues, blacks’ “last hired, first fired” status made practically any 
steady job in New Deal America desirable. In fact, unemployed whites were now 
filling many jobs traditionally held by African Americans.34
Although no historian has conducted an appraisal of the long-term benefits 
of the CCC’s vocational program, evidence from Yorktown suggests that at least two 
groups of students received employment as a direct result of their training in the 
CCC. Many of the students that enrolled in the Yorktown CCC’s food preparation 
and table waiting classes were offered full-time employment in the recently opened 
taverns and hotels of Colonial Williamsburg. Several enrollees in the camps’ 
woodworking classes became so skilled in their craft that the Colonial park staff 
asked them to create reproductions of colonial furniture. The park staff hailed their 
reproductions and the enrollees eventually began making furniture for historical 
national parks in Boston and Philadelphia. Several of the men later left the CCC to 
become skilled laborers for North Carolina furniture manufacturers.
34 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln.
35 Newport News Daily Press. 11 February 1937, 3; Charles M. Hunter, “The Civilian 
Conservation Corps in Williamsburg,” unpublished report, Williamsburg Area Historical 
Society, Williamsburg, VA. In a recent survey of park artifacts, the National Park Service 
identified Yorktown CCC furniture pieces in virtually every colonial national park in the 
Northeast.
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In addition to providing feedback on vocational offerings, the Yorktown 
enrollees suggested changes in the camps’ high-school level courses. The 
introduction of an African American history class illustrates the ways in which 
enrollees encouraged their advisors to offer classes tailored to their interests. One 
particularly popular class since the inception of the camps’ educational program was 
“Civics and American History,” a course taught by Colonial Superintendent Floyd 
Flickinger. His lectures focused largely on the events of the American Revolution 
and the founding of the United States. When the educational advisors conducted a 
survey of enrollees in 1937, they found that the men also wanted a class “that talked 
about Negro history.” The educational advisors responded by working with Hampton 
Institute faculty to develop an African American history class. The class was well 
received, creating such a large demand that classes were held in the camps’ recreation 
halls because they were the largest spaces available to the advisors.
On Saturdays, the educational advisors provided career counseling to 
individual enrollees. The advisors maintained a network of relationships with local 
employers, employment agencies, and state relief officials. They met with enrollees 
to “ascertain their interests” and then “encouraged them to apply for any available 
positions.” If an enrollee needed to leave the camp for a job interview, the advisors 
worked with the camp commanders to attain leave passes. Camp commanders also 
consulted with the advisors to provide honorable discharges so that enrollees could 
leave the camps after finding gainful employment elsewhere. The CCC supported the 
job placement services of the educational advisors because they wanted to move the
36 Camp NM-4 Inspection Report, 24 May 1939, “Virginia NM-4” file, Box 134, Records of 
the Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, MD.
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men off of public relief rolls and into the job market if  possible. Unfortunately, few 
jobs were available until the late thirties when Tidewater area defense contractors 
such as Newport News Shipbuilding began increasing their capacity.
The development of the CCC’s educational program is a case study in the 
ways in which local black elites and individual enrollees challenged the CCC’s policy 
of discrimination. The work undertaken by Hughes Robinson and Arthur Howe at 
Yorktown provided the genesis for the CCC’s entire education program. Their 
frustration upon learning that the CCC would not hire black teachers was echoed by 
state and national leaders, forming a powerful chorus of dissent. Robinson, Howe, 
and national black organizations capitalized on white insistence on segregation and a 
newly amenable federal government to gamer support for the employment of black 
educators in all-black CCC camps—the only supervisory position ever available to 
African Americans in the CCC. The enrollees responded by actively participating in 
the classes and offering directions for course content.
CHAPTER III 
A DAY IN THE LIFE
African American enrollees in the CCC, unlike Robinson and Howe, did not 
have access to prominent CCC officials and Roosevelt cabinet members to air their 
grievances. They instead turned to a long tradition of black resistance to arbitrary 
authority and social exclusion. The enrollees at Yorktown acted on a daily basis to 
circumvent the CCC’s racial stratification and strict regimentation. These acts of 
resistance, or what James C. Scott terms “infrapolitics,” served notice to the camps’ 
commanding officers that the enrolled men would not submit willingly to traditional 
structures of Army authority. Using techniques as widely divergent as work 
stoppages and public protest, the enrolled men at Yorktown attempted to shape their 
own work and their leisure with varying degrees of success. In their relations with 
communities outside of the camps, black enrollees found acceptance in nearby black 
neighborhoods, and publicly voiced their frustration with the white residents of 
Yorktown in a narrowly averted race riot.1
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The United States Army had the largest role of any government agency in the 
administration of the CCC. They were forced to place a large number of men in the 
field in a very short period of time. In fact, within a year, the CCC was triple the size 
of the nation’s standing Army.2 The harried attempt to place men in the field led the 
Army to adopt military policy as the central basis for CCC camp administration. The 
commanding officers in the CCC were all junior officers rotated through reserve lists 
in the United States Army. The Army chose the company-unit size of 202 men as the 
ideal number of men that could be sustained in the field. CCC camp structures were 
little more than pre-fabricated buildings developed by the Army for quick assembly 
on military bases. Everything within the camps looked and felt like an Army base. 
The physical structure of the camp was matched by the Army’s development of an 
authority structure.3
The Army’s book manual of regulations for CCC camp commanders—called 
“the Bible” by many camp commanders— describes in great detail how the CCC 
camps were administered. The text urged each commander to “model his camp on 
the finest camps in the American military.” Enrollees were not to participate in 
military training, but the regulations stated that “a military system of authority was 
crucial” to the development of a successful camp. The handbook given to CCC 
enrollees upon entering the program trumpeted in bold letters, “Without discipline, 
there could be no CCC.” Thus, CCC commanding officers developed a system of
/
This figure comes from the ongoing research of Jjm^teely^atjhe University of Texas at 
Austin. He is currently working on a large-scale study of CCC men that later served in 
World War II.
3 Charles Johnson, “The Army, the Negro and the Civilian Conservation Corps: 1933-1942,” 
Journal of Negro History 52 (June 1965), 75-88.
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authority, including rules and regulations, which closely matched those in operation 
at other military installations.4
For enrollees, their indoctrination into a military way of life began almost 
immediately after their acceptance into the CCC. Luther Wandall, a 21 year-old 
black enrollee from New York City, joined the CCC after carefully considering its 
links to the Army. His brother, a World War I veteran, advised him emphatically, “I 
wouldn’t be in anything connected with the Army.” Wandall decided to ignore his 
brother’ concerns, and enrolled in the CCC at his local Home Relief Bureau. Three 
days later, he reported to Pier I, North River in New York City to complete his 
registration. Upon arrival, he signed another set of forms and was then ushered into a 
“a large warehouse” where Wandall waited over four hours to take an oath to the 
CCC, after which he and a large group of men “marched,” under the instruction of an 
Army officer, to the U.S. Army headquarters on Whitehall Street. The men 
underwent thorough physical examinations, just like those given to recruits in the 
regular Army. Wandall was then placed into a group of 35 men and loaded onto a 
bus. Army meal rations containing “beans, pickles, bread, coffee, and butter” were 
distributed as the men were informed that their bus was headed to a conditioning 
camp at Fort Dix, New Jersey.5
Wandall arrived at Fort Dix for what the Army called “conditioning training.” 
It was here, in these conditioning camps, that enrollees received their first 
indoctrination into Army discipline and structure. As Wandall stepped out of the bus,
4 United States Army, Civilian Conservation Corps Camp Commanders Manual and 
Regulations (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1934), 2-3; 
Civilian Conservation Corps, Your CCC: A Handbook for Enrollees (Washington, D.C.: 
Happy Days Publishing Company, 1936), 22.
an officer stood shouting, “You will double-time as you leave this bus, remove your 
hat when you hit the door, and when you are asked questions, answer ‘Yes, sir,’ and 
'No, sir.’” And it was here that Wandall first encountered the CCC’s policy of 
segregation. Wandall and his fellow black enrollees were told to “fall out in the 
rear.” They waited in line over two hours until every white enrollee had been 
registered and taken to their tents. Wandall was led to the black area of the camp and 
discovered that the tents were “the worst in Camp Dix—old, patched without floors 
and electric light.” According to Wandall, the “separation of the colored from the 
whites was completely and rigidly maintained at this camp.” Fort Dix was not alone 
in its practice of segregation. The Army instructed every conditioning camp 
throughout the country to separate black and white enrollees within the camps in 
preparation for their service in the CCC.
Wandall spent nine days in the camp marching, drilling, and generally 
becoming acquainted with a regular work schedule.6 Breakfast was served at 6:15 
A.M., men were to report to their work sites by 7:00, lunch was served at 12:00, work 
ended at 3:30, dinner was served at 5:00, and the evening was often consumed by 
lectures on discipline and personal hygiene. On the day before his departure,
Wandall received his official CCC uniform. The pile of clothing included two sets of 
green work fatigues, a pant and shirt outfit with tie for formal occasions, and a pair of 
Army issue boots. The uniform served several purposes. It clearly marked the men
5 Luther Wandall, “A Negro in the CCC,” Crisis 42 (August 1935), 244.
6 The duration of stay within the conditioning camps varied depending on the CCC’s 
need for replacements. Some men stayed in the camps up to two weeks, while others 
were shipped to their campsites in three days.
as members of the CCC and it provided a uniform dress that matched the doctrine of 
obedience and uniformity required by the Army.7
When enrollees departed their conditioning camps, officials placed them in 
groups of varying size and then transported them via bus or train to CCC camps 
throughout the country. Enrollees rarely discovered where they would be placed until 
they were in route to their destination. Wandall joined one of the four CCC camps at 
Yorktown, Virginia. His camp was composed entirely of young black men, between 
the ages of 18 and 25, from the New York City area. Another camp was composed of 
World War I veterans from the New York City area. Yorktown’s remaining two 
camps contained men from Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, D.C.; all of the men
o
went through conditioning training at Fort Monroe in Hampton, Virginia.
After arriving at their camps in Yorktown, the men found a rigid top-down 
command structure. The commanding officer was the ultimate source of authority. 
The commanders followed a set of basic rules first introduced in the conditioning 
camps. The men were expected to keep a clean living area; report to mess and work 
in a timely fashion; work to the best of their physical ability; stay away from alcohol 
and drugs; and observe all state and local laws. Rule infractions were handled in 
several different ways following traditional Army practice. Minor infractions could 
result in the loss of a weekend furlough or a fine against future wages, whereas major 
infractions often resulted in a dishonorable discharge. Camp commanders, however, 
were limited in their response to misdeeds when compared to Army commanders. 
CCC camp commanders did not have their own judicial system like the Army. Minor
7 Wandall, 244.
8 Wandall, 253.
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infractions were punishable by a fine against future wages up to $3 or assignment to 
kitchen duty. Enrollees found in violation of local and state laws had to be handed 
over to local police authorities.9
The men’s violations of the rules formed a part of everyday life in the 
Yorktown camps. Most disciplinary actions in camp were taken against men that 
refused to work. The enrollees at Yorktown worked on a wide array of projects 
including road construction, landscaping, archaeology, and historical military 
embankment reconstruction around the city of Yorktown. The work was often 
difficult, requiring long hours in hot, humid Tidewater, Virginia summers and winter 
temperatures that often fell below freezing. Not all of the men found the work 
dreadful. Luther Wandall commented, “The work varies, but is always healthy, 
outdoor labor. As the saying goes, it's a great life, if  only you don't weaken.”
However, not everyone had the same positive attitude toward the rugged labor.10
Rigorous toil at the work site, followed by the military-like regimentation of 
life within the camps, led many of the enrollees to conclude that their entry into the 
program was a serious mistake. The records of the Yorktown camps contain 
voluminous annual reports on individual desertions. The act of desertion became so 
common that enrollees developed their own term for desertion—“going over the hill.” 
For example, one afternoon a Yorktown CCC camp received 15 new men from the 
conditioning camp at Fort Monroe. Their camp commander held a short meeting in 
which each enrollee was given his work assignment for the following month. Four of 
the men, after hearing that they would be relocating trees along a scenic highway,
9 United States Army, Civilian Conservation Corps Camp Commanders Manual and
Regulations (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1934), 42.
refused to go to work the following morning. When their commanding officer found 
them in their barracks, the men demanded to be sent home, but their officer refused. 
After he left, the four men gathered their belongings and fled the camp on foot.11 
Another enrollee from the same camp boldly informed his work site foreman that he 
“didn’t intend to do a lick of work in the CCC.” The foreman reported the man to his 
commanding officer and recommended that he be dismissed from the CCC.
During the life of the Yorktown camps, five to ten percent of new enrollees 
deserted the camps within their first month of service. CCC camp commanders and 
officials abhorred the practice, but they could do little to stop it. CCC deserters,
i ^
unlike Army soldiers, did not face criminal prosecution for their actions. Instead, 
camp commanders issued a handbook that encouraged dispirited enrollees to “take 
their troubles to the camp commander. He will help you.” The handbook also 
warned potential deserters, “such a habit may grow on [you]. Whenever you find a 
job that’s hard, you are going to quit. No one can desert without feeling that he 
‘couldn’t take it.’” Camp commanders also reacted to the desertions by periodically 
moving men to different job sites to alleviate boredom and overexertion. Desertion 
and the threat of desertion offered enrollees a critical tool in their efforts to mitigate 
against unwanted forms of authority.
10 Wandall, 254.
11 Camp NM-1 Narrative Report, 17 April 1935, “NM-1” file, Box 74, Records of the Land 
and Recreational Planning Division, Record Group 79, National Archives, College Park, MD.
12 Camp NM-1 Narrative Report, 17 April 1935, “NM-1” file, Box 74, Records of the Land 
and Recreational Planning Division, Record Group 79, National Archives, College Park, MD; 
For an analysis of similar events in an all-white camp consult Reed Engle, Everything was 
Wonderful: A Pictorial History of the Civilian Conservation Corps in Shenandoah National 
Park (Luray, VA: Shenandoah Natural History Association, 1999).
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The Yorktown enrollees also found more subtle ways to express their 
discontent with work assignments. Many of the enrollees lodged complaints with 
their assistant leaders—a carefully selected group of black enrollees that possessed 
technical skills relevant to a particular job site. These men worked with the National 
Park Service’s technical foremen, all o f whom were white, to supervise the enrollees 
in their daily tasks. While on the job, the enrollees effectively used their assistant 
leaders as information couriers in their labor relations with the park’s technical staff. 
The assistant leaders were known to convince the technical staff to end work early on
1 'Xhot summer days and to avoid hazardous working conditions in the forest.
The assistant leaders were equally important to the technical staff for many of 
the very same reasons. The technical foremen needed the assistant leaders to help 
them coordinate difficult construction projects such as landscaping along the park’s 
scenic roadway and the reconstruction of Revolutionary and Civil War earthworks. 
One camp commander attested to their importance in a report to the Department of 
the Interior in which he referred to the men as “the backbone of the camp.” When 
several of the assistant leaders in Camp NM-1 were forced to leave the CCC at the 
end of their two years of service, their commander wrote to the Third Corps area 
director, “I believe it would be a fitting reward for their loyalty, to allow them to re- 
enlist, and it would most certainly help us to do our work more efficiently, thereby 
keeping public criticism to a minimum.” Despite his appeal, the CCC refused to 
allow an exception to the program’s two-year service limit.14
13 Camp NM-1 Narrative Report, 11 October 1935, “NM-1” file, Box 74, Records of the Land 
and Recreational Planning Division, Record Group 79, National Archives, College Park, MD.
14 Ibid.
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The CCC’s limited term of service proved to be a wedge in the development 
of close relationships among the enrolled men. Each man enrolled for one enlistment 
period, which lasted six months. At the end of that term, the enrollee could go home 
or re-enlist in the program. Some of the men chose to leave immediately, others 
stayed until they were able to arrange for a job elsewhere. No matter what he desired, 
no enrollee was allowed to enlist for a period exceeding two years. Thus, every 
March and September, the camp experienced fluctuations in enrollment as men came 
to the end of their six-month enlistment periods. In periods of high turnover, the 
population of the camp could drop from 200 to 110 overnight. One commander 
complained to his Corps Area commander, that at the end of each enlistment period 
“there follows a period of about a month where there is a struggle to keep the work 
projects moving with the man power remaining. Then almost without warning we 
have about 100 recruits dropped upon us.” The continual movement of personnel led 
to a biyearly turnover that made it difficult to create lasting relationships in the 
camps.
The Yorktown enrollees at Yorktown also varied greatly in age and 
background. Two of the camps, designated NM-1 and NM-2, contained junior 
enrollees—single men between the ages of 18 and 25—from Virginia and Maryland. 
Meanwhile, Camp NM-3 housed junior enrollees from “the tenements and alleys of 
Harlem.” One camp observer commented that the mix of men from very different 
backgrounds led to “factions and dissention.”16 To further complicate the mix, Camp
15 Camp NM-4 Narrative Report, 14 May 1934, “NM-4” file, Box 75, Records of the Land 
and Recreational Planning Division, Record Group 79, National Archives, College Park, MD.
16 Camp NM-1 Investigation Report, 19 May 1933, “Virginia NM-1” file, Box 134, Records 
of the Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, MD;
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NM-4 contained World War I veterans from New York and New Jersey. In order to 
circumvent another invasion of the Bonus Army—a group of World War I veterans 
that marched on Washington to demand the early payment of their war bonuses, these 
men were given a special exemption to join the CCC by President Roosevelt. Unlike 
the young men in the other three Yorktown camps, most of the men in Camp NM-4 
were forty to fifty years of age. The age difference between the men in NM-4 and the 
other three camps led to spatial divisions within the camps’ public areas. For 
example, the older men generally kept to themselves in the mess hall and were unable 
to “take part in the more active sports” offered in camp.17
In fact athletic events were unique in their tendency to foster close bonds 
among the participants while, at the same time, spurn divisions between the four 
camps. Each year, the commanders organized basketball and baseball tournaments, 
pitting the four camps against one another. Members from each camp competed for 
their respective teams, and enthusiastically cheered on the members of their camp. 
These team allegiances solidified the men’s identity as a group and placed them in an 
adversarial relationship with the members from other camps. Despite such 
tendencies, the opposite effect occurred when all-star teams, containing men from all
Camp NM-2 Investigation Reports, 10 March 1934, “Virginia NM-2” file, Box 134, Records 
of the Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, MD; 
Camp NM-3 Narrative Report, 5 October 1935, “NM-3” file, Box 75, Records of the Land 
and Recreational Planning Division, Record Group 79, National Archives, College Park, MD.
17 E.W. Jordan to George Peery, 20 June 1934, “Federal CCC” file, Box 16, Executive 
Correspondence, The Executive Papers of George C. Peery, Library of Virginia, Richmond, 
VA; Camp NM-4 Investigation Report, 16 February 1938, “NM-4” file, Box 135, Records of 
the Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, MD.
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four camps, competed against black servicemen from Fort Monroe and Langley 
Airfield. In this case, the men joined together to support their athletes.18
Yet despite the barriers placed in their way, the men in Yorktown 
formed alliances and friendships that helped ease the daily toil of their work 
assignments. Enrollees with vastly different backgrounds and experiences were 
drawn together by the close quarters of camp life and the limitations placed on their 
leisure by the white residents of Yorktown. In the fight to exercise their leisure, black 
enrollees were challenged by a hostile white community and the official policies of 
the CCC.
The CCC enrollee handbook clearly stated the CCC’s leave and furlough 
policy: “from the time you enroll in the CCC until you are discharged, your time 
belongs to the government—24 hours a day.” Weekend and evening furloughs were 
granted with the permission of the camp commander. The men spent many Saturday 
mornings cleaning their bunks and working on camp facilities. Sunday was generally 
a day for leisure outside of the camps, but even that was not guaranteed if the camp 
commander decided that enrollees were needed for work within the camps. The camp 
commanders quickly discovered that the power of granting furloughs proved useful in 
encouraging the men to follow orders. Leave passes could be revoked if enrollees 
violated camp rules and they could be given as rewards for hard work and good 
behavior.
When enrollees were denied permission to leave the camps, many decided to 
leave anyway. The monthly reports filed by Yorktown camp commanders are replete
18 Yorktown Sentinel and Review. 20 March 1935,4; Yorktown Sentinel and Review. 15 
May 1935,4; Ye Olde York Times. 20 March 1936, 2.
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with notations of enrollees that went absent without leave (AWOL). Most enrollees 
listed as AWOL returned to the camp within one day or merely reported several hours 
late. The rates of men reported AWOL rose dramatically following Easter, 
Thanksgiving, and Christmas. During the holidays, the enrollees were often given 
multi-day passes to visit friends and family. Following Easter weekend in 1936, 
camp commanders at Yorktown noted, “roughly 20 men went home for Easter and 
enjoyed their stay too well. As a result, they will be smoking stumps this weekend. 
Quite an expensive Easter Monday for them.”19 In the Army, AWOL soldiers could 
be court-martialed for their actions. In the CCC, commanders could only levy fines 
or discharges. The fines charged to each enrollee were usually minimal for a first 
offense, because camp commanders feared that a more harsh punishment would 
encourage the enrollee to desert.20
Enrollees that successfully garnered leave passes faced strict limitations on 
their movements in Yorktown. Many white residents were willing to accept the 
segregated black camps as long as the men stayed within their confines on the far 
western edge of the park, over one mile from the center of town. The local 
community adopted an outwardly austere acceptance of the camps, but they never 
accepted the right of enrollees to spend their leisure time in Yorktown proper. The
attitudes of the local white community became abundantly clear following a brutal
0 1storm that hit Yorktown only two months after the camps were first established.
19 Ye Olde York Times. 25 April 1936, 3. During construction of the Colonial parkway, 
enrollees fell or transplanted thousands of trees. The stumps and root bulbs left behind by the 
cut trees were pulled from the ground and then burned, thus the term “smoking stumps.”
20 Your CCC. 34-35.
21 Stephen Early to Robert Fechner, 28 August 1933, “York County, Virginia file, Box 604, 
General Correspondence of the Director, Record group 35, National Archives, College Park,
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On August 23, 1933, a violent hurricane angled toward the east coast of the 
United States and slammed into the harbor at Yorktown. The 100-mile per hour 
winds fueled an eight-foot surge of water that engulfed the entire Yorktown 
waterfront. The record-breaking storm caused massive flood and wind damage from 
South Carolina to Boston, Massachusetts and was directly responsible for 18 deaths. 
The community of Yorktown was littered with debris from fallen trees and homes 
that were damaged or destroyed. Along the waterfront, over fifty ships lay on the 
shore, tossed from their moorings in the harbor and every building suffered severe 
water damage.22
The next morning, York County Commonwealth Attorney Paul B. Crockett 
sent an urgent telegram to Robert Fechner pleading for the immediate assistance of 
the CCC. Fechner agreed, and sent Yorktown’s four camp commanders a memo 
explaining, “It seems to me that in a disaster of this character, we are justified in 
rendering whatever aid we can and I therefore authorize you to use [CCC] men in 
responding to appeals for help in this locality.”23 The commanders quickly 
assembled a crew of 100 enrollees to assist in the local cleanup effort. One group of 
men carried off heavy logs and other debris from the waterfront, while another
MD; Superintendent’s Monthly Report, August 1933, Records of Colonial National 
Historical Park, Yorktown, VA, 11-12.
22 Superintendent’s Monthly Report, August 1933, Records of Colonial National Historical 
Park, Yorktown, VA, 10-11.
23 Paul W. Crockett to Robert Fechner 25 August 1933, “York County, Virginia” file, Box 
604, General Correspondence of the Director, Record Group 35, National Archives, College 
Park, MD.
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cleared away debris from Water Street, the town’s main thoroughfare, so that the road 
could be reopened to traffic.24
Fechner outlined the cleanup efforts underway in Yorktown for President 
Roosevelt. Stephen Early, the President’s assistant secretary, responded,
“[Roosevelt] thinks this would make a good story and should be given to the 
newspapers at once.” Town authorities, however, did not share Roosevelt’s 
enthusiasm. In fact, following the CCC’s heroic first day, Crockett demanded a 
meeting with park superintendent Floyd Flickinger and the four CCC camp 
commanders. He believed that the enrollees should have been under more “close 
supervision,” and that several members of the camps had been found “looting.” 
Flickinger and the commanders denied the charges, but gave their consent to 
Crockett’s plan for proper supervision. The commonwealth attorney proposed that 
“the Monument rangers be sworn in as sheriff deputies, and that their main function 
would be to guard the men moving debris.” The men were treated as prisoners, kept 
under armed guard as they attempted to help the citizens of Yorktown recover from 
the storm. Following the incident, Flickinger and the camp commanders agreed to 
limit the enrollee’s access to Yorktown’s waterfront business district.
Only five months after the hurricane, the enrollees directly challenged the 
limitations placed on their leisure and addressed the real and perceived racism of the 
local white community. The men grew increasingly weary of Yorktown’s community
24 Robert Fechner to Duncan K. Major et al, 25 August 1933, “York County, Virginia file, 
Box 604, General Correspondence of the Director, Record Group 35, National Archives, 
College Park, MD.
25 Stephen Early to Robert Fechner, 28 August 1933, “York County, Virginia file, Box 604, 
General Correspondence of the Director, Record group 35, National Archives, College Park,
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policing efforts. The animosity between both parties erupted in a narrowly averted 
race riot that illustrates the ways in which fear, anger, and rumor intersected to create 
a potentially violent situation.
On January 20, 1934, nine year-old Alfred Moore was playing with his 
younger sister in the backyard of his stepfather’s farm, located just outside of the park 
boundaries. In the midst of slaughtering a pig, Alfred’s stepfather, H.C. Ferguson, 
asked the boy and his sister to go into the woods adjacent to his property and locate a 
rope that he had left there. Several minutes later, Ferguson heard a shrill scream 
coming from the woods. He and his wife ran into the woods and discovered Alfred 
lying in a shallow hole with blood streaming from his forehead. They quickly loaded 
the children into a truck and rushed the injured boy to the hospital. After Alfred was 
taken away by one of the doctors, Ferguson asked the little girl what had happened 
while they were in the woods. She replied that Alfred had been beaten on the head by 
“a large black man.” Ferguson contacted the local sheriff and formed his own 
informal posse to aid in the investigation.26
The authorities immediately focused their attention on the four CCC camps at 
Yorktown. In a community that had always been apprehensive about the introduction 
of 800 African Americans, the Alfred Moore attack appeared to be a realization of 
their greatest fears. In addition, a violent set of rumors had been circulating 
throughout the Tidewater region that merely added fuel for the flame. One of the 
most widely circulated rumors was that local blacks were purchasing ice picks to
MD; Superintendent’s Monthly Report, August 1933, Records of Colonial National 
Historical Park, Yorktown, VA, 11-12.
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attack white citizens. Blacks were said to be collecting massive arsenals with which 
they would kill white men and steal white women. These rumors were invariably 
false, but they created a culture of fear, which provided the social context for any 
violent act deemed racial in nature.27
In his landmark study of the 1917 East St. Louis race riot, sociologist Elliot 
Rudwick wrote, “during periods of tension and crisis, when people are jittery and 
willing to believe almost anything, rumors [are] manufactured, rapidly circulated, and 
of course accepted uncritically by many citizens.” In East St. Louis, whites grew 
angry as local factories hired black workers to thwart the power of all-white unions. 
Democratic politicians fed on this anger by suggesting that the Republican Party was 
actively recruiting southern blacks to move into the area to tilt the outcome of the 
next election. When news spread that a black man had killed a white man during a 
robbery, an angry white mob took to the streets eventually killing at least 39 African 
Americans.28
In Yorktown some local white citizens responded to their own fears and false 
rumor by organizing gangs of white men that rode past the camps uttering obscenities 
and violent threats. Local police officials stormed into the CCC camps’ sleeping 
quarters with dogs barking and flashlights waving, hoping to find evidence linking
26 Superintendent’s Monthly Report, January 1934, Records of Colonial National Historical 
Park, Yorktown, VA, 18-20; Newport News Daily Press. 21 January 1934, 1; Newport News 
Daily Press. 22 January 1934, 1; Norfolk Journal and Guide. 27 January 1934,1.
27 Howard Odum, Race and Rumors of Race: The American South in the Early Forties 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 96-105. Odum, writing in 1943, wisely 
states “if thousands of people who actually believed and passed on fantastic rumors just as 
they would actual happenings could sense the almost treasonable implications, it might go a 
long way toward checking the epidemic of so many emotional reactions.”
28 Elliott Rudwick, Race Riot at East St. Louis. July 2. 1917 (New York: The World 
Publishing Company, 1966), 1-28, 222.
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one of the men to the beating. The four camp commanders, fearing for the safety of 
their men, ordered everyone to remain in camp until further notice.29
The situation in Yorktown became even more complex the following day. 
That morning, six CCC enrollees left their camp without permission and broke into 
the park’s storage area on Wormley Pond. They grabbed one of the boats and several 
fishing rods and spent the balance of the morning attempting to catch fish. A park 
ranger noticed them out on the water and arrested the six men for stealing National 
Park Service property. The men were taken to their camp commander who then 
turned them over to the local authorities to be charged for theft. As the men were 
taken away, rumors began to spread among the enrollees that the men had actually 
been chosen as scapegoats for the Alfred Moore attack. Furthermore, several of the 
enrollees feared that the angry white mob that had driven past the camp the night 
before would lynch the six men as they sat in the local jail.30
The rumors were all completely false, but one must not discredit the types of 
emotions these comments must have generated among the black enrollees. The New 
York Times recorded 24 lynchings in 1933. Only one month before the Alfred Moore 
attack, “the most popular newspaper in camp,” the Norfolk Journal and Guide, had 
published an article chronicling the violent lynching of an African-American man in 
Alabama. In her analysis of the role played by rumor in the development of race 
riots, folklorist Patricia Turner notes that riots are most likely to occur in situations
29 Superintendent’s Monthly Report, January 1934, Records of Colonial National Historical 
Park, Yorktown, VA, 19; Norfolk Journal and Guide. 27 January 1934,1.
30 Superintendent’s Monthly Report, January 1934, Records of Colonial National Historical 
Park, Yorktown, VA, 19; Newport News Daily Press. 22 January 1934, 3;
31 New York Times. 3 December 1933, section VIII, 2; Norfolk Journal and Guide. 17 
December 1933,1.
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where blacks feel that one persecuted individual or group of people symbolizes, on a 
personal, identifiable level, “African-Americans’ frustrations with the state of 
affairs.”32 For the 800 enrollees at Yorktown, the men imprisoned in the local jail 
became a physical reminder of the racial animosity present in the local community. 
Out of their fears and anxieties, the enrollees took to the street in protest.
The men formed a large phalanx as they made the mile-long march from their 
camps to the local jail. When they finally arrived, the men encircled the jail and 
demanded the immediate release of the six men held inside. The local sheriff called 
the park and the nearby Naval Mine Depot asking for immediate backup. When 
Marines from the naval base and officials from the park finally arrived on the scene, 
they brokered a deal whereby the six men would be turned over to their camp 
commander for disciplinary action. The protestors outside of the building were 
assured that no action would be taken against them. With the help of the Marines, the 
area was cleared and the enrolled men returned to their camps.33
The following day, several local officials requested that the camps be 
removed. Floyd Flickinger, who feared losing his irreplaceable labor source, 
downplayed the incident in local newspapers and in his meetings with York County 
officials. He worked with community leaders to conduct a town hall meeting on 
preventing similar outbreaks in the future. It appears that his exhaustive campaigning 
worked. In fact, no mention of the Yorktown riot was ever made to the CCC’s 
administrative officials; six months after the riot, Camp NM-2 was recognized as the
32 Patricia Turner, I Heard it Through the Grapevine: Rumor in African-American Culture 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 45-56.
33 Superintendent’s Monthly Report, January 1934, Records of Colonial National Historical 
Park, Yorktown, VA, 19-20; Norfolk Journal and Guide. 27 January 1934, 1.
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best all-black camp in the country and the second best camp in the Third Corps 
area—black or white. The events of the past several months were conveniently swept 
under the carpet.34 For the men that participated in the protest, their actions had, at 
least for a moment, allowed them to express a vocal opposition to the discriminatory 
attitudes of the local white citizens on public ground ordinarily denied to them.
Problems with the local police surfaced again only one month after the riot. 
Harry Ford, an enrollee in Camp NM-3, was charged by his camp commander with 
“attempting to set fire to CCC property.” Following CCC practice, he was 
transported to the local jail for prosecution by local authorities. Ford claimed that he 
had been smoking beside a fellow enrollee’s bed when a lit cigarette dropped from his 
mouth and onto a newspaper on his bunkmate’s bed. According to Ford, the 
newspaper ignited and the fire then spread to the bedding. Ford’s version of the 
events was confirmed by at least two other enrollees, but the commanders refused to 
believe him. Ford stood trial for arson in the York County Court and was sentenced 
to “one year on the chain gang.” Ford responded to the sentence by writing to the 
CCC asking for a formal inquiry. The notes from that investigation no longer exist, 
but CCC officials convinced the court to reduce Ford’s sentence to three months. The 
conviction of Ford and the severity of his sentence further confirmed for enrollees the 
animosity of the local white community.35
34 Superintendent’s Monthly Report, January 1934, Records of Colonial National Historical 
Park, Yorktown, VA, 20-21; Camp NM-2 Narrative Report, 25 October 1934, “NM-2” file, 
Box 74, Records of the Land and Recreational Planning Division, Record Group 79, National 
Archives, College Park, MD.
35 Documents pertaining to the Ford case can be found in Camp NM-3 Investigation Report, 
10 March 1934, “Virginia NM-1” file, Box 134, Records of the Division of Investigations, 
Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, MD.
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In surrounding black communities, CCC enrollees found the acceptance and 
excitement denied them by the white citizens of Yorktown. Borrowing the terms of 
historian Earl Lewis, the Yorktown enrollees “turned segregation into congregation.” 
Weekends were periods of leisure for the Yorktown enrollees. It was on the 
weekends that they tried to escape the endless toil of the CCC camps. The enrollees 
entered places like Uniontown and Newport News to articulate what historian Robin 
Kelley calls “the grievances and dreams of an exploited class.” Trips to neighboring 
black communities became a valuable release from the atmosphere in camp.36
The most popular weekend gathering spot was Uniontown, an all-black 
community located only several minutes north of the camps. Founded by newly freed 
blacks following the Civil War, Uniontown was a small enclave of residences and 
black-owned businesses. The enrolled men came into the town to buy drinks at local 
bars and pursue relationships with local women. Tales of Uniontown shenanigans 
became legendary. One story recounted in the camp newspaper described the despair 
of one enrollee who squandered 18 months of earnings to entice the woman of his 
dreams—to no avail. Although the commanders felt that Uniontown was “a hotbed 
of ill-rest and contention,” the enrollees enjoyed their weekly visits because the
36 Earl Lewis, In Their Own Interests: Race. Class, and Power in Twentieth Century Norfolk. 
Virginia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 91-92; Kelly, Race Rebels. 44. My 
research into the leisure activities of the black working class is also informed by Tera Hunter, 
To Jov Mv Freedom: Southern Black Women’s Lives and Labors after the Civil War 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) and Roy Rosenzweig, Eight Hours for What 
We Will: Workers and Leisure in an Industrial City. 1870-1920 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985).
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members of the community readily accepted and embraced them, unlike the citizens 
of Yorktown.37
The camp commanders also organized weekend trips to nearby cities. On one 
excursion, a large group of men watched John Barrymore in “Raffles” at Richmond’s 
most popular black theater—the Hippodrome. But one enrollee found the atmosphere 
outside of the theater even more interesting than what was taking place inside.
"There were girls galore on Second Street,” he fondly recalled, “it looked like 
‘Sweethearts on Parade.’ Love failures were the source of fun all the way back to
-  ^  9*38camp.
In Norfolk, enrollees spent their weekend nights on Church Street, an area that 
enrollees jokingly nicknamed “Negro heaven.” Church Street featured a two-block 
section that local blacks remembered as a little oasis in the desert or “our street.” The 
area offered a variety of black-owned businesses including drug stores, cafes, 
barbershops, pool halls, social clubs, beauty parlors, and taxi stands. Black residents 
of Norfolk in the 1930’s fondly recall that nighttime on Church Street “was 
showtime.” People were “togged down to perfection,” wearing “flaming pocket 
handkerchiefs” and vivid neckties. Bystanders lined the streets “joking, jiving,
37 Yorktown Sentinel and Review. 11 March 1935, 4; Yorktown Sentinel and Review. 10 
September 1935, 3; Ye Olde York Times. 20 March 1936, 1. The above titles refer to 
newspapers created by the men enrolled in the CCC’s journalism classes. Copies of the 
remaining CCC newspapers are housed in the Library of Congress. My brief history of 
Uniontown draws upon my numerous conversations with park historian Jane Sundberg. 
Kelley Deetz, a student at William and Mary, recently completed a senior honors thesis on 
the community. Many of these black communities, including Uniontown, now exist only in 
the minds of those who once lived there. As the naval installations around Yorktown grew in 
size, many African Americans were displaced to make way for the construction. A similar 
process took place in nearby Williamsburg where large African American communities were 
forced to move in order to make way for the reconstruction of Colonial Williamsburg and a 
CIA training center at Camp Peery.
38 Yorktown Sentinel and Review. 11 March 1935, 1.
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arguing, but always smiling.” One group could be discussing Joe Louis’s chances in 
his next fight, another a recent run of bad numbers, another the causes of the 
depression, and another the “respective merits of girls at a recent dance.” One former 
resident stated, “there was an intangible comfort to that banter. It was escape for 
many, escape from the daylong toil in the white man’s world. The faces, the laughter 
were music to the Negro’s soul, the rhythm of the crowd a solace.”39
In places like Norfolk, enrollees were able to escape the rigid structure of 
camp life and partake in an active, vibrant black working class culture. The environs 
of Church Street were the antithesis of life in the CCC camps. Amid the hustle and 
bustle of a Saturday night in Norfolk, the racial animosity of Yorktown was 
temporarily lost in a fog of acceptance and excitement.
The efforts of Yorktown enrollees to shape their own experience in the CCC 
extended to their religious practice. The men that chose to remain in their quarters on 
Sundays were not happy with the religious services offered by the camp commanders. 
Initially, the Army decided to supply the camps with white military chaplains. In 
Yorktown, the Army appointed one chaplain to cover all four camps. But shortly 
after his appointment, the camp commanders expressed concern over the 
extraordinarily low rate of attendance at the camps’ church services.40 After speaking
39 Remembrances of Church Street in the 1930’s can be found in Works Projects 
Administration, The Negro in Virginia (Winston-Salem, N.C.: John F. Blair Publishing, 
1994), 369-388.
40 Camp NM-1 Investigation Report, 10 March 1934, “Virginia NM-1” file, Box 134, 
Records of the Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College 
Park, MD; Camp NM-3 Investigation Report, 10 March 1934, “Virginia NM-3” file, Box 
135, Records of the Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College 
Park, MD; Camp NM-3 Investigation Report, 20 December 1934, “Virginia NM-3” file, Box 
135, Records of the Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College 
Park, MD.
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to their assistant leaders and several of the enrolled men, they discovered that the men 
resented the appointment of a white chaplain and preferred the services of a local 
black minister. Many of the men in fact left the camp on Sunday mornings to attend 
services in Newport News and other surrounding communities. In places of worship 
such as Shiloh Baptist Church in Uniontown, the enrolled men found religious 
services featuring a more expressive and musical atmosphere than the rather staid 
services conducted in the camps. Furthermore, their attendance at local churches 
served to strengthen the ties between the enrollees and the local black community.41
In June of 1935, shortly after the CCC reversed its policy on black 
education advisors, the program opened the position of camp chaplain to black 
applicants. Yorktown was one of the first camp sites in the country to receive a black 
chaplain. The camps’ first black chaplain, along with his successors, introduced a 
radically different service style more in line with those conducted at local black 
churches. They also initiated a program to provide monthly visits from prominent 
local clergy. Although many of the men still chose to attend local churches, the 
attendance at camp services more than doubled following the CCC’s introduction of 
black chaplains.42
The enrolled men of Yorktown continued to resist the regimentation of their 
program for the duration of the CCC. The enrollees successfully created pockets of
41 Camp NM-1 Investigation Report, 19 May 1933, “Virginia NM-1” file, Box 134, Records 
of the Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, MD. A 
similar debate was underway at Hampton Institute as students began to protest the style of 
religious ceremonies performed in the campus worship hall.
42 Camp NM-4 Investigation Report, 16 February 1938, “NM-4” file, Box 135, Records of the 
Division of Investigations, Record Group 35, National Archives, College Park, MD.
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power that allowed them to have a voice in the day-to-day operation of the Yorktown 
CCC camps. They also counteracted the animosity of the local white population by 
finding refuge and acceptance in surrounding black communities. Their critiques of 
CCC policy and local hostility reinforced and inspired local and national efforts to 
end discrimination and segregation in the CCC.
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CONCLUSION
Approximately 3000 men served in the CCC camps in Yorktown. The remnants 
of their handiwork can be witnessed throughout the Tidewater region. Revolutionary 
War earthworks, originally built by slaves, were restored to their original condition. The 
nation’s first large-scale archaeology project, performed largely by CCC labor, 
discovered artifacts related to the arrival of the first slaves into the colony at Jamestown. 
Tourists walking the grounds at Yorktown today are likely unaware of the CCC’s history 
at Yorktown. Unfortunately, historians have been unaware of their actions as well.
The four CCC camps at Yorktown illustrate that the CCC was most segregated at 
the local level. State selection agents placed limitations on black enrollment and many 
white communities refused to accept African American CCC camps. In Yorktown the 
support of white residents rested solely on the enforcement of segregation within the 
camps and within the community. Black enrollees were not allowed to serve in a 
supervisory capacity, because local citizens believed that the employment of black 
supervisors would jeopardize the positions held by white foremen. CCC officials co­
opted the segregationist arguments of local communities under the guise of buttressing 
local acceptance of black camps.
Whites’ insistence on segregation within the CCC allowed blacks to turn that very 
insistence against them. Hughes Robinson, with the assistance of Arthur Howe, 
introduced an educational program in the Yorktown camps that served as a model for the 
entire CCC. Black enrollees embraced the program, despite their long and arduous labor, 
and worked with Robinson and their subsequent instructors to promote courses that
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provided marketable job skills. When the CCC introduced its own educational program, 
black teachers were not eligible for the positions. Using a “separate but equal” argument 
much like the NAACP’s legal strategy at the time, black leaders encouraged a Roosevelt 
administration in search of black votes to allow African Americans to serve as 
educational advisors in black camps.
Within the camps, enrollees abhorred the rigid Army discipline and authority 
practiced by camp commanders and the limits placed on their leisure by the white 
residents of Yorktown. The black men in the camps did not have Robinson or Howe’s 
access to prominent officials, so they turned to a long tradition of black resistance to 
unwanted authority and exclusion. Inside of the camps, enrollees placed limits on their 
authoritarian commanders by deserting or lodging complaints with their black assistant 
leaders. Outside of the camps, enrollees took to the streets to protest the perceived 
mistreatment of six fellow enrollees by local authorities and the limitations placed on 
their leisure by Yorktown residents. Incensed by the discrimination in Yorktown proper, 
enrollees found excitement and acceptance in local black communities.
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